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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN THE MACHINELEARNING STATE
Aziz Z. Huqt

A new class of "machinelearning" tools is able to make allegedly better predictions and inferences from data than has
previously seemed feasible. For the state, machine learning is
a powerful and supple device to reveal citizens' hidden beliefs,
actions, and expected behaviors. Its deployment to allocate
investigative resources, welfare benefits, and coercive penalties to particularindividuals, though, can implicate due process, privacy, and equality interests. The substantive
doctrinalframeworks and enforcement regimes for those entitlements, however, arose in the context of human action.
Neither is tailored to a machine-learningcontext. This Article
offers a start to the larger project of developing a general
account of substantive rules and enforcement mechanisms to
promote due process, privacy, and equality norms in the machine-learningstate. Cataloging notable state and municipal
adoptions of machine-learningtools, it considers how existing
constitutional norms can be recalibrated(in the case of due
process and equality) or retooled (in the case of privacy). It
further reexamines the enforcement regime for constitutional
interests in light of machine learning'sdissemination. Today,
constitutional rights are (largely) enforced through discrete,
individual legal actions. Machine learning's normative implications arisefrom systemic design choices. The retail enforcement mechanisms that currently dominate the constitutional
remedies context are therefore particularlyillftting. Instead,
a careful mix of ex ante regulation and ex post aggregate
litigation, which are necessary complements, is more
desirable.
INTRODUCTION ........................................
I.

THE MACHINE-LEARNING TURN IN GOVERNANCE ......

1876
1885

A. New Instruments of Prediction and Inference. 1885
1890
B. The Machine-Learning State .................
t Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago
Law School. Thanks for David Freeman Engstrom, Sharad Goel, Margot Kaminski, Mark Lemley, Julian Nyarko, Alan Rozenshtein, and Ravi Shroff for many
helpful comments and critical conversations. The Frank J. Cicero Fund provided
support for this research. All errors are mine.
1875

1876

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:1875

1. Machine Learning and the Regulatory
State ...................................
2. Machine Learning and the Allocative
State ...................................
3. Machine Learning and the Punitive State:
FacialRecognition as a Case Study .......
II.

APPLYING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES IN THE MACHINELEARNING STATE .................................

A. Procedural Due Process ....................
1. ProceduralDue Process Norm .............
s
2. Application to Machine Learning ..........
3. Testing Algorithmic Design Against Due
Process Norms ..........................
4. Mathews and Machine Learning ..........
B. Equality and Antidiscrimination Norms ......
1. Equal ProtectionNorms ..................
2. Applying Equal Protection Doctrine to
Machine Learning .......................
3. Equality and Machine Learning
Reconsidered ...........................
C. Privacy......................................
1. ConstitutionalPrivacy Norms .............
2. Privacy Risks from Machine Learning .....
3. Privacy Rights in the Machine-Learning
State ...................................
D. Constitutional Norms for Machine Learning: A
Sum mary ...................................
III.

1892
1894
1899
1905

1905
1907
1908
1910
1915
1917
1918
1919
1923
1927
1927
1929
1931
1937

CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIATION IN THE MACHINELEARNING STATE .................................

1938

A. Regulating Algorithms .......................
1. Substantive Regulatory Interventions......
2. Transparency and DisclosureMandates ...
B. Litigating the Constitutionality of Algorithms.

1940
1941
1943
1948

CONCLUSION ..........................................

1952

INTRODUCTION

A deep skepticism of the state lies at the heart of American
constitutionalism.1 Aspiring toward government under the
rule of law, American constitutionalism aims to tame the
state's risks to individual entitlements even as it enables con1

See Judith N. Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL

LIFE 21, 24-25 (Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989).

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

2020]

1877

tributions to the public good. Technology mediates this tradeoff. 2 The state's power to shape the lives of its citizens, whether
for good or ill, has always been a function of the instruments at
its disposal. 3 Today, one technology transforming how the
state acts is a class of computational tools called "machine
learning." These instruments derive predictions and inferences
in new ways, often exploiting pools of otherwise largely opaque
data. 4 Many encounter machine-learning tools first in the
marketplace. Facebook, for example, uses them to determine
what clickbait tempts best; Amazon uses them to predict what
products you'll likely purchase. 5 In state hands, machinelearning tools do more than recommend dietary supplements
or fashion accessories. Rather, they can exploit previously lowvalue data-e.g., administrative records, criminal justice
records, or public surveillance footage-to generate startling
insight into people's beliefs, actions, and likely behavior.
Consider some present and future implications. Public
surveillance cameras typically produce thousands of hours of
footage. This is far too much to be examined manually, at least
some very particularized starting inquiry. Machine-learning
tools can be cheaply trained to analyze large volumes of footage
and to recognize faces or patterns of conduct through analyses
that take a fraction of the time and effort needed for human
inspection. 6 In a different context, new computational tools
This is a central theme of JAMES C. SCOTr, SEEING LIKE A STATE: How CERTAIN
2
SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE FAILED 24 (1998) (exemplifying the

"pattern of relations between local knowledge and practices" and "state administrative routines"). See also CHARLES S. MAIER, LEVIATHAN 2.0: INVENTING MODERN
STATEHOOD 86-93 (2012) (describing the interaction of technological changes dur-

ing

the Industrial Revolution and the European state).

3 Technology is not the only determinant of this liberal dilemma. The range
of institutional forms available to the state also matters. Most famously, the
historian Stephen Skowronek underscores the move from a state of "courts and
parties" to one channeled through national bureaucracies. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK,
BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACI-

TIES 1877-1920, at 24, 35 (1982).
4 Sendhil Mullainathan & Jann Spiess, Machine Learning: An Applied
Econometric Approach, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 87, 88 (2017) (defining machine learn-

ing in terms of its capacity for "out of sample" prediction). For further details on
machine learning and its functionalities, see infra text accompanying notes 34 to
46 (defining machine learning).
5

6
VERGE

See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM 233-34 (2019).

James Vincent, Artificial Intelligence Is Going to SuperchargeSurveillance,
(Jan. 23,

2018,

10:54 AM),

https://www.theverge.com/2018/1/23/

[https://
16907238/artificial-intelligence-surveillance-cameras-security
perma.cc/YGR4-3GAY]. Machine-learning-driven analysis of video surveillance,
though, is not proof against counterstrategies, such as the use of "adversarial
patches" on clothing that undermine common inference strategies. See Simen
Thys, Wiebe Van Ranst & Toon Goedeme, Fooling Automated Surveillance Cam-
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can be trained to analyze the way in which a person holds and
swipes her cellphone so as to uniquely identify a user. 7 Commercial banks are already using such biometric signatures to
enable remote account access. 8 Someday soon, state uses of
the same functionality will follow.
Such examples may understate the significance of machine learning. The latter is a "powerful and highly generalizable set of capabilities" that "in principle . .. can be applied to
the management of any complex system, from the steering and
guidance of a car to the shaping of public policy." 9 As such,
machine learning can generate action-guiding predictions
about who should be detained,1 0 who should be deported, 1 1
who should be audited, 12 who should be fired from state offices, 13 who should be deemed in need of state assistance,14
and even who should be killed.1 5 Across these applications,
machine learning has the potential to greatly improve on imeras: Adversarial Patches to Attack Person Detection, 2019 IEEE/CVF CoNF. COMPUTER VISION & PATTERN RECOGNITION WORKSHOPS 49, 49-50, https://iee

explore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=9025518 [https://perma.cc/
55TB-VE2F].
7 Claire Reilly, The Way You Swipe Your Phone Could Be Used to Track You,
CNET (July 31, 2018, 10:45 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/the-way-you[https://perma.cc/3RJUswipe-your-phone-could-be-used-to-track-you/
WVPR].
8 Alison Arthur & Bethany Frank, Five Examples of Biometrics in Banking,
ALACRrnI (May 8, 2019), https://www.alacriti.com/biometrics-in-banking [https:/
/perma.cc/ZS8Z-UEVY].

9

ADAM GREENFIELD, RADICAL TECHNOLOGIES: THE DESIGN OF EVERYDAY LIFE 226

(2017) (emphasis added).
10 Aziz Z. Huq, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J.
1043, 1072-76 (2019) (describing the use of machine-learning tools in ball and
sentencing contexts).
11 Spencer Woodman, Palantir Provides the Engine for Donald Trump's Deportation Machine, INTERCEPT (Mar. 2, 2017, 11:18 AM), https://theintercept.com/
201 7/03/02/palantir-provides-the-engine-for-donald-trumps-deportation-machine/ [https://perma.cc/D2LK-EAYR] (reporting that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) awarded a private contractor a $41 million contract to build
an "Investigative Case Management" system to allow DHS to "access a vast
'ecosystem' of data to facilitate immigration officials in both discovering targets
and then creating and administering cases against them").
12 Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Regulating by Robot: Administrative Decision Making in the Machine-Learning Era, 105 GEO. L.J. 1147, 1163 (2017).
13 Derek W. Black, The Constitutional Challenge to Teacher Tenure, 104 CALIF.
L. REV. 75, 92-96 (2016) (describing federally mandated adoption of "valuedadded models" for teacher evaluation).
14 Colin Lecher, What Happens When an Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care,
VERGE (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/
17144260/healthcare-medicaid-algorithm-arkansas-cerebral-palsy [https://
perma.cc/J9RD-3KMJ].
'5 Will Knight, The Dark Secret at the Heart of Al, MIT TECH. REv. (Apr. 11,
2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/604087/the-dark-secret-at-theheart-of-ai/ [https://perma.cc/7D94-2FD2] ("The U.S. military is pouring billions
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perfect human action or, alternatively, to generate new social
costs and also to compound malign forms of social
stratification.
This Article documents this ongoing technological shift in
state action. I then analyze how important individual rights to
due process, equality, and privacy can be conceptualized and
then implemented in a context of growing state reliance on
machine learning. My first aim is hence descriptive. I highlight
a subset of ground-level applications of the machine-learning
state that most sharply implicate rights-related concerns.
While new computational-tools technology can be used at
many different points of the policy-making, legislating, and administrative processes, I think the sharpest normative concerns are likely to arise when an algorithm proximately causes
a state benefit or penalty to be assigned (or withheld) to (from) a
specific individual. 16 This is not, to be sure, the only application of machine learning that can generate worries. Normative
concerns can also arise when a machine-learning tool is used
to allocate investigative resources, especially when becoming a
target of investigation has immediate costs. Documenting both
existing and likely future uses of machine learning, particularly
by state and local governments, I draw attention to ways such
deployments can implicate due process, equality, and privacy
concerns. I do not claim such worries are wholly new. In some
instances, constitutional concerns track those presented by
human action. At other instances, novel worries arise when a
machine is involved.
This descriptive exercise exploits the fact that a disparate
scattering of plaintiffs are starting to challenge algorithmic instrument in federal and state court. 17 Cases have arisen in the
bail and sentencing context in Wisconsin, 18 California, 19

into projects that will use machine learning to pilot vehicles and aircraft, identify
targets, and help analysts sift through huge piles of intelligence data.").
16 Those concerns are not wholly absent where individualized determinations
are not at stake, but I will focus here on cases of individualized machine determinations because they present the constitutional issues most acutely.
17 An algorithm is "any well-defined computational procedure that takes
some value, or set of values, as input and produces some value, or set of values,
as output." THOMAS H. CORMEN, CHARLES E. LEISERSON, RONALD L. RIvEST & CLIF-

FORD STEIN, INTRODUCTION TO ALGORITHMS 5 (2d ed. 2001) (emphases omitted). Ma-

chine learning tools are a distinctive subset of algorithms; most of the algorithms
challenged in the cases discussed here have been simpler beasts.
18

State v. Loomis, 881 N.w.2d 749, 753 (Wis. 2016).

19 People v. Superior Court (Chubbs), No. B258569, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 105, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2015).
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Ohio, 20 and New York. 2 1 Litigation often hinges on whether a
particular algorithm can be disclosed consistent with trade
secrets law. 2 2 Legal questions are not confined to the criminal
justice realm. In Houston, a teachers' union brought an action
against an algorithmic tool used to evaluate job performance
2 3 In Arand determine discharges on due process grounds.
kansas, state disability recipients filed suit against the Arkansas Department of Human Services alleging that an "unlawful
switch to the computer algorithm" had violated the state's ad4
ministrative procedure act.2 None of these cases, though,
grapple head-on with the novel questions presented by constitutional challenges to the machine-learning state. To the contrary, their evasion of these questions hints at a need for more
systemic thinking about how relevant constitutional norms
should be adapted and how existing regulatory and litigation
structures are best retrofitted to achieving constitutional compliance today.
Having established a descriptive baseline, I develop two
lines of normative analysis. The first takes up ways in which
norms of due process, privacy, and equality might be usefully
recalibrated as the state shifts from human to machine action.
Second, I offer a general account of how the enforcement regime for these rights might best account for the distinctive
qualities of a machine-learning state. I sketch the core points
of both analytic arcs in brief here.
In regard to the first question of constitutional substance, I
focus on due process, equality, and informational privacy concerns because they seem to be the rights most immediately
pertinent in the machine-learning state. Whereas the Court
has developed detailed doctrinal accounts of due process and
privacy, the constitutional law of informational privacy is thin.
20

State v. Jennings, No. 2013 CA 60, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 2248, at *13

(Ohio Ct. App. May 30, 2014).
Flores v. Stanford, No. 18 CV 2468 (VB), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160992, at
21
*11-12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept 20, 2019).
22 See Chubbs, 2015 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 105, at *9; Loomis, 881 N.w.2d
at 761.

23 Hous. Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F.
Supp. 3d 1168, 1171 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (challenging "the use of privately developed
algorithms to terminate public school teachers for ineffective performance" on due
process grounds).
24 Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 S.W.3d 336, 339 (Ark.
2017); see also Michael T. v. Bowling, No. 2:15-CV-09655, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
123749, at *7-9 (S.D. W. Va. Sept. 13, 2016) (reviewing a due process challenge to
algorithmic benefits calculation for the developmentally disabled); K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703, 706-07 (D. Idaho 2016) (reviewing a due process

challenge to software used to calculate Medicaid benefits).
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Even accounting for this difference in the degree of doctrinal
development, a gap separates extant doctrinal formulations of
all three rights and the technological terrain of machine learning. Present doctrinal formulations do not necessarily track
the values underlying rights to due process, equality, or privacy
when the focus shifts from human to machine action. (Perhaps
those doctrinal formations are a bad match to more mundane
nonmachine institutional settings and problems. But making
that point is not my concern here). Even if they do not completely displace human judgment, and even if prior dispensations entailed some human reliance upon structured decisionmaking tools such as checklists or simple algorithms, I contend that machine-learning tools raise constitutional concerns
in different ways from human action. Yet constitutional rights
have been calibrated with human behavior in mind. 25
My modest aim here is to suggest in a preliminary way
some ways in which doctrine can be adjusted or extended given
the novel technological landscape. To emphasize, these are
suggestions and not definitive prescriptions. The technological
and social landscape is changing rapidly. It would be foolish to
aver certainty. I aim here to start a conversation and not to
provide conclusive answers.
Technological changes places pressure on the formulation
of due process, equality, and privacy interests in subtly different ways. For example, in the most familiar cases that courts
have historically addressed, due process is advanced by giving
regulated subjects an opportunity of a hearing before an individual adjudicator or an appeal to a new adjudicator. If we are
concerned with minimizing the net volume of false positives
and false negatives, however, there is reason to believe that a
human appeal of a machine decision will often be counterproductive. Rather, due process may require changes to a classifier to reduce the risk of errors.
An example of the constitutional equality implications of
changing from human to machine-derived judgments involves
the calculation of recidivism risk in the criminal justice system.
How should discrimination be defined and policed here? On
the one hand, the increasing use of computational prediction
tools may well reduce the opportunities for implicit or explicit
25 In addition, because lawyers and judges are not trained in either computer
science or statistics, understanding of how machine-learning tools work-and
how they are similar to, or diverge from, other governance instruments-is not yet
widespread. Obviously, this article is an effort to start filling that gap-albeit from
the perspective of a lawyer and not a computer scientist or statistician!
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bias on the part of adjudicators such as judges and magistrates
to influence decisions. On the other hand, those same tools
may also embed assumptions about racial and ethnic groups in
ways that reproduce undesirable patterns of residential, economic, and social stratification. This can happen without any
intentional discrimination, and can involve a number of quite
different mechanisms. Whereas equality-related regulation of
human actors might usefully focus on concepts of bias and
discriminatory intent, it may be more useful to consider computational predictive tools in terms of their predictable disparate effects.
Finally, consider privacy. Constitutional rules under the
Fourth Amendment regulate how the state collects data about
its citizens and other regulated subjects and have little to say
in how that information is used. 2 6 A technology that allows the
state to exploit publicly available data-surveillance footage,
public records, and commercial records not protected by the
Fourth Amendment-for insights into individual conduct
means the state can eschew surveillance regulated by the
Fourth Amendment and yet acquire the same information with
relative ease. Thanks to technological change, therefore, the
existing Fourth Amendment will increasingly fail to shelter constitutional privacy interests. Indeed, the risk to privacy from
the state might soon emerge through quite unexpected vectors,
for instance through the incidence of data theft from the
databases that the state creates in order to implement machine-learning tools. 2 7
There is a second, somewhat more abstract, reason for
looking closely at the implementation of constitutional rights in
the machine-learning state. Knowledge and understanding of
26 For an analysis of technological change's influence on surveillance, see
Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 3 (2008) (describing the "National Surveillance State [as] a special case of
the Information State-a state that tries to identify and solve problems of governance through the collection, collation, analysis, and production of information").
In contrast, there is surprisingly little scholarship on how the state uses information it can collect without constitutional regulation. For a prescient but lonely
treatment of use restrictions under the Fourth Amendment, see generally Harold
J. Krent, Of Diaries and Data Banks: Use Restrictions Under the Fourth Amendment, 74 TEX. L. REv. 49 (1995) (arguing that the reasonableness of a seizure
extends to uses even after law enforcement seizes information).
27 Consider, for example, the risk of data breaches that comes with expanded
algorithmic capacity. See Owen Daugherty, Oregon State Agency Suffers Data
(Mar. 21, 2019, 6:20 PM),
Breach, Potentially Exposing Personal Information, HILL
2
https: / /thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/435 18-oregon-state-agency-suffers-breach-potentially-exposing-personal-data [https://perma.cc/TBB8-CFQ5];
see infra Part II.C (discussing privacy implications of data breaches).
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computational tools are presently not widely shared. The general public in particular lacks a clear or precise understanding
of those instruments or their limits. Machine learning is taking
root in the state even before legal professionals have absorbed
all that much technical knowledge or practical understanding.
It is reasonable to predict that new adoptions of machine learning will endow the state with new capabilities, but will also be
distinctly difficult to understand from the perspective of both
participants in the legal system and the public. Indeed, it is
plausible to worry that increases in state power will be correlated with a diminishing capacity on the part of regulated subjects to understand or challenge exercises of that power. 28 To
be sure, this asymmetrical effect may be buffered by the efforts
of well-meaning computer scientists to educate the public and
the legal profession about machine learning. But I am skeptical that such efforts will be sufficient. As a result, state adoptions of predictive and inference tools are likely to increase the
difficulty that citizens have monitoring and responding to its
activities, even as the scope of those activities grows.
The second main contribution of this Article is an analysis
of the institutional arrangements through which constitutional
values might best be vindicated. At present, constitutional
norms of due process, privacy, and equality are in the main
developed and vindicated via a common-law process of discrete, incremental, and ex post litigation. The process largely
relies on the "liability in tort" model commonly identified with
the common law. 29 In previous work, I have criticized the discrete and individuated forms through which constitutional
rights are enforced in the ordinary course of nonmachine governance. I have suggested that they too often fail to properly
constrain the state and also for embodying controversial and
regressive moral intuitions. 3 0 I have also argued in favor of
28

Cf. JAMIE

SUSSKIND,

FUTURE POLITICS: LIVING TOGETHER IN A wORLD TRANS-

FORMED BY TECH 168-87 (2018) ("The future state, armed with digital technologies,

will be able to monitor and control our behaviour much more closely than in the
past."). The literature's relative inattention to machine learning and other analytic tools is perhaps a result of the Constitution's direct regulation of information
acquisition through the Fourth Amendment and its more diffuse and indirect
regulation of information processing and use.
29 Steven Shavell, Liabilityfor Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 357, 357 (1984).
30
See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq & Genevieve Lakier, ApparentFault, 131 HARV. L. REV.

1525, 1547-48 (2018) (arguing that courts require apparent fault (i.e., that a
defendant violated not only the law but also a social understanding of legality)
before remedying constitutional wrong); Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts
Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REv. 519, 581-86 (2014) (arguing that habeas review applies a

similar fault regime); Aziz Z. Huq, Judicial Independence and the Rationing of
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conceptualizing constitutional harms in terms of systemic dy31
namics implicating collective interests.
Consistent with those arguments, I argue here that the
constitutional concerns raised by machine-learning tools, like
many other public policies, are best addressed through a mix of

ex ante regulation and aggregate litigation (i.e., litigation seeking to vindicate the interests of a specific individual). Outside
the machine-learning state, this aggregative model has largely
failed. This defeat is in large measure due to judges' hostility
toward certain constitutional rights (and perhaps also to certain populations, such as criminal defendants and prisoners).
But the novelty of computational tools presents an opportunity
for doing better. I thus press here the possibility that the machine-learning state is well suited to a combination of ex ante
regulation and ex post collective auditing (albeit without assuming that non-algorithmic policies would not benefit from
this same approach).
In particular, I explore the application of strategies of ex
ante regulation, such as technology mandates and transparency regimes of various forms. One aim of such interventions is to facilitate ex post inquiry into whether and how a
machine-learning tool behaves "in the wild" (which may be
quite different from how it behaves "in the lab"). Then, in respect to auditing instruments through ex post litigation, I underscore the utility of wholesale, prospective, and system-wide
forms of relief. Again, nothing in what follows should be construed to imply that similar mixes of regulation and aggregate
litigation would be inapt for other contexts. Quite the contrary.
Perhaps the "shock of the new" in the machine-learning context
will prompt a more general reconsideration of how we regulate
to achieve constitutional rights.
The argument proceeds as follows. Part I recounts how the
state leans increasingly on machine-learning tools as aid or
substitute for human decision making. Part II considers how
due process, privacy, and equality values might be recalibrated. Part III then examines how ex ante regulation and
ex post aggregate litigation might be combined to ensure that

Constitutional Remedies, 65 DUKE L.J. 1, 70-74 (2015) (noting that a fault regime

for constitutional remedies leads to unequal treatment of constitutional wrongs,
unequal vindication of constitutional rights, and unequal treatment of litigants).
31 See, e.g., Aziz Z. Huq, The Consequences of Disparate Policing:Evaluating
Stop and Frisk as a Modality of Urban Policing, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2397, 2438-39
(2017) (arguing that police misconduct fails to breed collective efficacy).

2020]

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

1885

machine-learning instruments remain consistent with constitutional norms.

I
THE MACHINE-LEARNING TURN IN GOVERNANCE

In the last decade, advances in the computational science
of machine learning have enabled new functionalities of prediction and inference. 3 2 The state leverages these new tools to
vindicate traditional policy ends or to pursue novel goals.
Whatever the consequent hazard to constitutional values, there
is little chance that the state will forego these new technologies.
Quite apart from their efficiency gains, the United States is
under intense pressure from domestic interest groups, such as
big tech firms, and from geostrategic competitors to accelerate
development and diffusion of machine learning. 3 3 One reason
to analyze constitutionalism in the machine-learning state is
thus the political inevitability of the latter's adoption in the
context of a growing range of state functionalities. To that end,
this Part describes the core of the technology at issue, recent
and impending state and local adoptions, and some of the en-

suing litigation challenges.
A.

New Instruments of Prediction and Inference

In general terms, a machine learning algorithm is a computational tool designed to solve a "learning problem . . . of improving some measure of performance when executing some
task, through some type of training experience." 3 4 At an operational level, machine learning has been described in simple
terms as follows: "You give the machine data, a goal and feedback when it's on the right track - and leave it to work out the
32 See Jonathan Schmidt, Mirio R. G. Marques, Silvana Botti & Miguel A. L.
Marques, Recent Advances and Applications of Machine Learning in Solid-State
Materials Science, 5 NPJ COMPUTATIONAL MATERIALS 1, 1-2 (2019).
33 For a political economy of machine learning's adoption by the state, see

Mariano-Florentino Cuellar & Aziz Z. Huq, Privacy's Political Economy and the
State of Machine Learning:An Essay in Honor of Stephen J. Schulhofer, 72 NYU
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 14-18 (forthcoming 2020).
34 M. I. Jordan & T. M. Mitchell, Machine Learning: Trends, Perspectives, and
Prospects, 349 SCIENCE 255, 255 (2015); see also Susan Athey, The Impact of
Machine Learning on Economics, in THE ECONOMICS OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 507,

509 (Ajay Agrawal, Joshua Gans & Avi Goldfarb eds., 2019) ("[M]achine learning is
a field that develops algorithms designed to be applied to data sets, with the main
areas of focus being prediction (regression), classiflcation, and clustering or
grouping tasks.").
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best way of achieving the end."3 5 The common method of supervised learning, 3 6 for example, entails first supplying an al3 7 and then
gorithm with a labeled set of training data
instructing it to derive (or learn) a rule that discriminates be3 8 Thus, the
tween two subsets within the training sample.
training data might comprise a set of images, labeled "dog,"
"cat," and "rat." The algorithm might then be instructed to
learn a rule to separate images of dogs from cats or rats. Supervised learning can be binary or multiclass, as in this example. 3 9 It can also entail estimation of a continuous rather than
a categorical variable. Using a random starting formulation of
a decision rule, the algorithm will at first do no better than
random at predicting the right subset. But by perturbing the
rule and evaluating whether changes produce more or less accurate results, the algorithm can "learn" a rule that does pre40
dict well how the data's features map onto those subsets.
This classifying rule, though, is not the direct result of human

design.
Notwithstanding the simplicity of this explanation, machine-learning tools can be highly complex in ways that defeat
any effort at either facile explication or reverse engineering. To
be sure, there is a real debate about whether machine-learning
35

HANNAH FRY, HELLO WORLD: BEING HUMAN IN THE AGE OF ALGORITHMS 11

(2019); see also JERRY KAPLAN, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 32 (2016) (providing a simi-

lar colloquial description).
36 Jordan & Mitchell, supra note 34, at 257 (defining supervised learning as a
process in which "the training data take the form of a collection of (x, y) pairs and
the goal is to produce a prediction y in response to a query x*"). Note that this
definition is framed in terms of binary classification. This process can also be
described in terms of a "classifier," rather than a function, that examines inputs
with "feature values" and outputs a class variable. Pedro Domingos, A Few Useful
Things to Know About Machine Learning, 55 COMM. ACM 78, 79-80 ("A classifier is
a system that inputs (typically) a vector of discrete and/or continuous feature
values and outputs a single discrete value, the class."). An unsupervised machine-learning algorithm begins with unlabeled training data and develops classifications based on the data's immanent structure. PETER FLACH, MACHINE
LEARNING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF ALGORITHMS THAT MAKE SENSE OF DATA 14-17

(2012).
See COMM. ON THE ANALYSIS OF MASSIVE DATA ET AL., FRONTIERS IN MASSIVE
37
DATA ANALYSIS 104 (2013).
ETHEM ALPAYDIN, MACHINE LEARNING: THE NEW AI 46-47 (2016) ("A class is a
38

set of instances that share a common property ... there exists a formulation of
the class in terms of those [certain] characteristics, called a discriminant.").
39 See Javaid Nabi, Machine Learning-Multiclass Classification with Imbalanced Dataset, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Dec. 22, 2018), https://towardsdatascience. com/machine-learning-multiclass-classification-with-imbalanced-dataset-29f6a177cla [https://perma.cc/U9N4-9X2F].
40
ARLINDO OLIVEIRA, THE DIGITAL MIND: How SCIENCE IS REDEFINING HUMANITY
96-97 (2017) (exploring the inductive character of machine learning).
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tools are fundamentally different from the statistical models
that have been in widespread use long before computational
power allowed the exploitation of big data. 4 1 However that debate is resolved, at least some applications of machine learning
are clearly so quantitively different from earlier statistical techniques that they might as well be different in kind.
To get a sense of this potential for complexity, consider the
example of deep-learning networks. The latter are "deep" in the
sense of relying on multiple layers of nodes through which
inputs are channeled and processed. 4 2 Important forms of
deep learning are recurrent neural nets (RNN), which are used
in text recognition and translation tools, and convolutional
neural nets (CNN), which are central to machine vision. 4 3 Both
RNNs and CNNs process large volumes of training data (such
as millions of images or large bodies of text) each with
thousands or millions of features. They exploit networked
structures to process this data in ways that their constituent
elements could not do on their own. An early and influential
deep-learning instrument, designed by Geoffrey Hinton and
colleagues, handled data with some sixty million parameters. 4 4
Deep networks can perform some inference tasks that simple
instruments cannot. Today, the ChronoNet CNN can examine
photographic images to estimate the date at which they were
taken 4 5 and inspect electroencephalogram images to predict
the incidence of epilepsy and other brain disorders. 4 6
The design of any machine-learning tool requires a number
of judgments that are not mechanically determined by a computational theory or by the logical forms to algorithmic design.
Importantly, choices first need to be made about what training
41 See generally Jongbin Jung, Connor Concannon, Ravi Shroff, Sharad Goel,
& Daniel G. Goldstein, Simple Rules for Complex Decisions, 138 J. ROYAL STAT.
SoCY 771 (2020) (arguing that complex decision rules often do not perform better
simple predictors).
42 Yann LeCun, Yoshua Bengio, & Geoffrey Hinton, Deep Learning, 521 NATURE 436, 438 (2015) (defining deep learning).
43

JOHN D. KELLEHER, DEEP LEARNING 160-62, 181-83 (2019).

Alex Krizhevsky, Ilya Sutskever, & Geoffrey E. Hinton, ImageNet Classtfication with Deep ConvolutionalNeural Networks, in ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION
PROCESSING SYSTEMS 25, at 5 (Fernando Pereira, Christopher J.C. Burges, Leon
Bottou & Kilian Q. Weinberger eds., 2012).
45 Blaise Aguera y Arcas, Margaret Mitchell, & Alexander Todorov, Physiognomy's New Clothes, MEDIUM (May 6, 2017), https://medium.com/@blaisea/
physiognomys-new-clothes-f2d4b59fdd6a [https://perma.cc/Q8NU-CYM7].
46 Subhrajit Roy, Isabell Kiral-Kornek, & Stefan Harrer, ChronoNet: A Deep
44

Recurrent Neural Network for Abnormal EEG Identification 1 (May 18, 2018)

(unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1802.00308.pdf
perrna.cc/BM2F-HUCK].

[https://
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data will be used. 4 7 Different selections of training data will
yield different predictive models. 4 8
In the state-action context, available data will often be a
product of historical state practices, such as the management
of public benefits or the policing of a particular geographic area
or ethnoracial concentration. If such historical practices were
flawed or biased, the data thereby produced may also be deficient or misleading in the sense of incorporating biases, blind
spots, or unwarranted assumptions. Such gaps or other deficiencies in the data then precipitate for the designer a further
question of about whether (and if so how) corrective measures
might be taken. 4 9
Then, once a set of training data set is in hand, a designer
must decide on which attributes, or "features," of the training
data to employ in learning a new rule. 5 0 Should gender, race,
or another protected trait, for instance, be among them? What
about variables that might closely and predictably correlate
with a protected trait, such as residential ZIP code? What if an
impermissible classification or its close proxy is necessary to
achieve reasonably good algorithmic performance (however
that is defined)?
At the same time, the designer needs to decide on an "outcome variable." 5 1 An algorithm will optimize a function of the
outcome variable and the model parameters (together called
the cost function) as a way to generate predictions. 5 2 Several
such outcome variables may be available, and yet none may
precisely track the underlying matter of policy interest. The
designer must then choose among unreliable proxies. 5 3 Similarly, the designer must decide which algorithmic method (e.g.,
47 In a useful article, Lehr and Ohm call this stage "playing with the data."
David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn
About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 653, 700-01 (2017) (describing
feature selection).
48

ALPAYDIN, supra note 38, at 71-84; Susan Athey, Beyond Prediction: Using

Big Datafor Policy Problems, 355 SCIENCE 483, 483 (2017) (explaining that machine-learning "programs take as input training data sets and estimate or 'learn'
parameters that can be used to make predictions on new data").
49 Lehr & Ohm, supra note 47, at 681-83.
50
Id at 700-01.

51

Id. at 672-73.

52 Id. In a bit more detail, each possible model (given by a set of parameters
like the coefficients in a regression equation) corresponds to a set of predictions of
the outcome variable. The cost function defines a "cost" or penalty between predictions and the true (observed) outcome, and then the aim is to minimize that
cost. For example, in the familiar context of linear regression, one is trying to
minimize the sum of least squares.
53
Id. at 675.
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naive Bayes, random forests, neural network, etc.) best fits her
problem, a choice which requires her inter alia to decide
whether to use a relatively straightforward instrument or to
select a more complex deep-learning tool. 5 4 This methodological choice is no simple matter. 5 5 Insiders describe "a field in
constant tribal warfare" between different approaches. 5 6
Within this field of contestation, the value of increasingly complex instrument design is particularly contested, with some
computer scientists warning that the increasing complexity
and sophistication of newer predictive tools has not yielded
performance gains sufficiently robust to "translate into real
advantages in practice" on real-world problems. 5 7
This, moreover, is not the full extent of necessary judgments by our designer. Another important challenge in designing machine-learning tools is the problem of "overfitting." 5 8
This occurs, in effect, when an instrument has been too good at
writing a predictor for the training data without accounting for
the fact that the latter is merely a noisy sample drawn from the
world. Solutions to overfitting require a measure of judgment
about how much to constrain the model's learning from the

training data. 59

Moreover, a computational instrument learns "specific
contingencies for particular scenarios." 6 0 It does not grasp underlying concepts. A consequence of this thin form of "understanding" is that tools can be brittle when confronted with
54 OUVEIRA, supranote 40, at 110-11. Note that the choice of features and
method is often made simultaneously.
55 Indeed, sometimes researchers mislabel the method that they have in fact
chosen. For cases of this, see Adrien Jamain & David J. Hand, Where Are the
Large and Difficult Datasets?, 3 ADVANCES DATA ANALYSIS & CLASSIFICATION 25,
29-31 (2009).
56 Carlos E. Perez, The Many Tribes ofArtificial Intelligence, MEDIUM (Jan. 12,

2017), https://medium.com/intuitionmachine/the-many-tribes-problem-of-artificial-intelligence-al-1300faba5b60 [https://perma.cc/52CG-PRYS] (listing symbolists, evolutionists, Bayesians, kernel conservatives, tree huggers, and
connectionists among those warring factions).
57 David J. Hand, Classifier Technology and the Illusion of Progress,21 STAT.
SCI. 1, 2 (2006).
58 PEDRO DOMINGOS, THE MASTER ALGORITHM: How THE QUEST FOR THE ULTIMATE
LEARNING MACHINE WILL REMAKE OUR WORLD 71-72 (2015) (describing overfitting

and characterizing it as the "central problem" of machine-learning design); see
also Krizhevsky et al., supranote 44, at 6 (describing technical solutions).
59 See, e.g., Mullainathan & Spiess, supra note 4, at 91-93 (describing the
process of regularization and empirical tuning to mitigate overfitting with decision
tree models).
60 Gary Marcus, Deep Learning: A Critical Appraisal 8 (Jan. 2, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.00631.pdf [https://perma.cc/
G6vG-KQSK].
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examples outside their training data. There is a risk that the
rate of successful prediction will drop rapidly when an instrument is "confronted with scenarios that differ in minor ways
from the . .. ones on which the system was trained show that
deep reinforcement learning's solutions are often extremely superficial." 6 1 "[H]idden feedback loops" can emerge after beta
testing.6 2 Adversarial tactics, such as the strategic deployment
of other machine-learning tools, can also induce misclassification.6 3 Such vulnerabilities can have nontrivial, even "catastrophic[ ]," consequences.64 For all these reasons, it is not
safe to assume that a machine-learning tool will operate predictably on data drawn from a different distribution from the

training data.
B.

The Machine-Learning State

Since the eighteenth century, a central component of state
building has involved deepening information-gathering capabilities and eroding private efforts to shield the person from the
state's gaze. 6 5 The state has also sought "legible form[s]" in
which to record data about individual citizens for easy "reading, processing, and relaying." 6 6 Machine learning advances
these epistemic projects by introducing new means of exploiting data that public authorities have to hand over for other
reasons. In private contexts, machine-learning tools are used
for tasks such as ranking (Google's and Netflix's algorithms)
and classification (credit-scoring tools and spam blockers). 6 7
The state can employ the same techniques of ranking and clas61 Id.; see also Robin Jia & Percy Liang, Adversarial Examples for Evaluating
Reading Comprehension Systems 2 (July 23, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1707.07328.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EYH-PAWG] (demonstrating that the accuracy of a language recognition CNN can be halved by inserting ungrammatical "junk" into the data).
62 David Sculley et al., Machine Learning: The High-Interest Credit Card of
Technical Debt, in ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 28, at 3
(Corinna Cortes, Neil D. Lawrence, Daniel D. Lee, Masashi Sugiyama, & Roman
Garnett eds., 2015).
63 Nicolas Papernot et al., PracticalBlack-Box Attacks Against Machine Learning, PROC. 2017 ACM ON ASIA CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURrIY 506, 510
(2017).

64 Brenden Lake & Marco Baroni, Generalization Without Systematicity: On
the Compositional Skills of Sequence-to-Sequence Recurrent Networks 1 (June 6,
2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1711.00350.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/RTV9-G56X.

65

SCOTT, supranote 2, at 89-92.

66 COLIN KOOPMAN, How WE BECAME OUR DATA: A GENEALOGY OF THE INFORMATIONAL PERSON 37 (2019).
67 FRY, supra note 35, at 8-9; see also DOMINGOS, supranote 58, at 8 (citing

"pattern recognition, statistical modeling, data mining, knowledge discovery, pre-
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sification to infer facts about regulated subjects' past behavior
or to predict their future actions. These inferences can then be
deployed to advance a wide range of policy ends: improving
criminal justice; refining education policy (especially teacher
hiring and retention decisions); targeting regulatory inspections (such as restaurant health inspections); identifying youth
at risk of criminal conduct or involvement; and predicting individual financial outcomes such as default. 68 At the same time,
there is no reason why prediction will be used solely for benevolent or wise ends. Predictive instruments are already used
overseas to stifle political opposition. 69 As a policy tool, that is,
machine learning is not intrinsically "good" or "bad." Its normative valence depends on how it is deployed and what collateral costs it imposes.
This section canvasses current and likely future uses of
machine learning by federal, state, and local governments in
both civil and criminal domains. In the former, predictive instruments are used to allocate enforcement resources, make
employment decisions, and assign benefits. In the latter domain, algorithms are used to direct coercion, in the form of
policing resources or incarceration, both before a criminal trial
and after sentencing. Adoption of machine learning is, I should
emphasize, presently uneven. At the moment, many jurisdictions use predictive instruments that have not been developed
using the methods described in subpart I.A. Baltimore, for
instance, makes bail decisions using a form generated by the
City's Pretrial Release Services containing seven questions and
a list of twelve mitigating or aggravating factors. 7 0 This seems
unlikely to endure. A recent study using New York bail data,
for example, boasts that deep learning might generate large
dictive analytics, data science, adaptive systems, self-organizing systems, and
more").
68 Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhl Mullainathan, & Ziad Obermeyer,
Prediction Policy Problems, 105 AM. ECON. REv. 491, 494 (2015).

69 See, e.g., Steven Feldstein, How Artificial Intelligence Is Reshaping Repression, 30 J. DEMOCRACY 40, 42 (2019) (noting how effective Al technology is for
repressing dissent). For a graphic and troubling example, see Paul Mozur, Inside
China's Dystopian Dreams: A.I., Shame and Lots of Cameras, N.Y. TIMES (July 8,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/business/china-surveillancetechnology.html [https://perma.cc/49SX-2CRB.
70 George Joseph, Justice by Algorithm, BLOOMBERG: CrYLAB (Dec. 8, 2016,
12:00 PM), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/12/justice-by-algorithm/
505514/ [https://perma.cc/87P2-2ZW8]. This comprehensive piece notes both
ambiguity in how the instrument was created and how it is applied. "[T]he relationship between risk scores, bail recommendations, and bail decisions remains
opaque." Id.
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efficiency gains in pretrial practice. 7 1 Given the allure of cost
savings (and, no doubt, lobbying by firms wishing to sell predictive instruments and the academics who advise them),
states are likely to adopt machine-learning tools over clinical
assessments or simple human judgment sooner rather than
later. Hence, what follows should be understood as exemplifying, not exhausting, the range of likely near-future uses.
1.

Machine Learning and the Regulatory State

The use of machine learning to guide enforcement resources, such as restaurant inspectors, tax audits, and fraud
detection, is increasingly common. 7 2 Some instances of these
machine-guided discretion raise important ethical and constitutional questions. For example, decisions about how enforcement resources are allocated can raise concerns about racial or
ethnic bias. 7 3 Cases in which a predictive instrument is used
to directly assign coercion or benefits to an individual obviously
can raise due process worries. And any data aggregate can
prompt privacy objections. By way of example, I flag here one
machine-learning tool used to allocate investigative resources
in a context fraught with normative peril.
This predictive tool was introduced in August 2016 in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania. 7 4 Allegheny Family Screening
Tool (AFST) extracted seventy-one features from a dataset created collaboratively by several state agencies as a basis in order
to predict instances of abuse or neglect amongst calls made to
a state hotline. 7 5 An AFST score capturing a risk of abuse was
displayed to case workers who receive and screen such calls
&

71 Jon Kleinberg, Himabindu Lakkaraju, Jure Leskovec, Jens Ludwig,
Sendhil Mullainathan, Human Decisionsand Machine Predictions, 133 Q.J. ECON.
237, 239-41 (2018).

72

Cary Coglianese & David Lehr, Transparencyand Algorithmic Governance,

71 ADMIN. L. REv. 1, 7-8 (2019) (collecting examples); see also Katelynn Devinney

et al., Evaluating Twitter for Foodborne Illness Outbreak Detection in New York
City, 10 ONLINE J. PUB. HEALTH INFORMATICS e120, e120 (2018) (reporting on New
York's use of Twitter data to guide health inspection of restaurants).
73 Kristen M. Altenburger & Daniel E. Ho, When Algorithms Import Private
Bias into Public Enforcement The Promise and Limitations of Statistical Debiasing
Solutions, 175 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 98, 99 (2019) (finding overreporting for ethnic restaurants).
74 Alexandra Chouldechova, Emily Putnam-Hornstein, Diana BenavidesPrado, Oleksandr Fialko, & Rhema Vaithianathan, A Case Study of AlgorithmAssisted Decision Making in Child Maltreatment Hotline Screening Decisions, 81
PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 134, 138, 143 (2018).
75 Id. at 136-38; see also VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALY: How HIGHTECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 132-42 (2018) (describing AFST's

implementation).
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and used to inform the decision to investigate or not. 76 An
investigation in turn could potentially end in a child's removal
from a home. Carefully timed disclosure was meant to avoid
excessive reliance on the score at the expense of more granular
information. 7 7 Nevertheless, case workers may presume the
AFST score is more accurate than their own observations. 78
Florida implemented a similar predictive tool in 2012,79 and
several states are studying its experience to determine whether
to follow suit. 8 0
Commentators have raised three normative concerns
about the AFST system. First, there is evidence from Allegheny
County of racial disparities in the decisions taken with the
AFST scores. Black families, for example, appear to experience
"disproportionate referrals" based on seemingly innocuous
events such as a missed doctor's appointments. 8 1 The designers of AFST identified a risk that either caseworker animus or
correlations between nonracial data (e.g., residential zip code)
and race could induce differential treatment of equally at-risk
Black and white children. 82
Second, some observers have raised a concern about the
"dehumanizing" effect on parents of having "their entire history . .. summed up in a single number." 8 3
Finally, the AFST system draws upon very large stocks of
state data by aggregating disparate information. The creation
of such aggregates, which might shed considerable light on
private facts and behaviors, likely creates a new risk of data
breaches.84 Equality, due process, and privacy, in short, are
all potentially in play in this Allegheny County system.
Despite these concerns, the use of machine learning in a
form akin to an AFST score appears relatively weakly constrained by constitutional norms. Federal administrative law
76
77

Chouldechova et al., supra note 75, at 138-39.
Id. at 144 (noting that AFST is "a decision-support tool that is presented to

call screeners at a specific juncture in the decision-making pipeline").
78 EUBANKS, supra note 75, at 141-42.
79 Darian Woods, Who Will Seize the Child Abuse PredictionMarket?, IMPRINT
(May 28, 2015, 10:58 AM), https://imprintnews.org/featured/who-will-seize-thechild-abuse-prediction-market/10861 [https://perma.cc/AEJ8-8H55.
80
Stephanie Cuccaro-Alamin, Regan Foust, Rhema Vaithianathan, & Emily
Putnam-Hornstein, Risk Assessment and Decision Making in Child Protective Services: PredictiveRisk Modeling in Context, 79 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REv. 291,
294 (2017).
81 EUBANKS, supra note 75, at 153-54.

82

Chouldechova et al., supranote 74, at 141.

83

EUBANKS, supra note 75, at 152.

84

See infra section II.C. 2-3 (discussing data breaches in more detail).
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imposes little check on decisions to forego enforcement 8 5 or
otherwise to manage the "day-to-day" implementation of regulation. 86 Indeed, "nearly unfettered discretion" is "thehallmark
of many executive decisions." 8 7 The deployment of algorithmic
technologies may make such evaluation yet more difficult, depending on the nature of the paper record generated by the
machine as opposed to the human decision maker. Those
against whom enforcement is initiated typically (if not inevitably 8 8 ) will also lack an evidentiary basis to complain about
being unfairly singled out on due process or equality grounds.
Litigation challenging AFST's equality-related or due process
concerns, in short, faces an uphill battle.
2.

Machine Learning and the Allocative State

Machine-learning tools can be used in the allocation or
withdrawal of individualized benefits such as employment or
financial aid. 89 In the early 2000s, states such began moving
to automate the distribution of public benefit systems in the
context of a larger movement to eliminate recipients from welfare. 90 Michigan, for example, introduced an algorithmic tool
to detect fraudulent applications for unemployment benefits as
part of a larger overhaul of the information technology by the
state. 9 1 Since then, states have increasingly relied on algorithmic tools to allocate both public benefits and state em85 Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985).
86 Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64, 66-67 (2004).
87 Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 227, 229-30 & n.2 (2006); accord Rachel E. Barkow, Foreword: Overseeing
Agency Enforcement, 84 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1129, 1130 (2016) ("Most aspects of

agency enforcement policy generally escape judicial review.").
88 It is not impossible to imagine complaints about political targeting, such as
those levelled against the Internal Revenue Service (perhaps unfairly) from 2014
onward. Alan Rappeport, In Targeting Political Groups, I.R.S. Crossed Party Lines,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/politics/
irs-targeting-tea-party-liberals-democrats.html !https://perma.cc/7DNA-RY36].
Similarly, if a municipality relied on public complaints about restaurants to drive
the allocation of enforcement resources, it would also risk potentially biased enforcement patterns. Altenburger & Ho, supra note 73, at 101-02.
89 See Esther Shein, The Dangers of Automating Social Programs, 61 COMM.
ACM 17, 17 (2018) (describing machine-learning tools used for Medicaid
allocation).
90 EUBANKS, supra note 75, at 45-51 (noting that automation resulted in a
fifty-four percent increase in denials of food stamps, Medicaid, and cash benefits
in Indiana).
91 Robert N. Charette, Michigan's MIDAS Unemployment System: Algorithm
Alchemy Created Lead, Not Gold, IEEE SPECTRUM (Feb. 16, 2018), https://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/computing/software/michigans-midas-unemploymentsystem-algorithm-alchemy-that-created-lead-not-gold [https://perma.cc/ZLZ9T29S].
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ployment. 9 2 Legal challenges to the substitution of algorithm
for human decision making in these domains tend to focus on
the procedural adequacy of the machine decisions. 9 3 In particular, plaintiffs underscore the risk of erroneous deprivations.
Although less attention is given to equality or privacy concerns,
they too may be lurking in the background.
Two examples illustrate how such tools are used and how
they are now being challenged in court. A first comes from
2016, when the state of Arkansas adopted an algorithm developed by a company called InterRAI to calculate disability benefits. 9 4 Its algorithm was not developed using machine-learning
methods. Rather, InterRAI is a clinical assessment tool9 5 that
relies on about sixty "descriptions, symptoms, and ailments" to
determine the quanta of home-care provision. 9 6 (I include it
here because it usefully illustrates the kind of challenges that
more sophisticated tools might face). According to the suit filed
by Legal Aid of Arkansas challenging the InterRAI algorithm on
state administrative law grounds, the instrument gave "no
weight" to the beneficiary's physician's input.9 7 The Supreme
Court of Arkansas enjoined the instrument's use on the ground
that it had been implemented in violation of the state's administrative procedures act without sufficient notice and
comment. 9 8
One of the points raised in the litigation was the possibility
that the InterRAI tool was brittle in the face of subtle or unusual variations in the way symptoms presented in a particular
case. 9 9 For instance, entering in different evaluations of a person's "foot problems" produced "wildly different scores when
the same people were assessed, despite being in the same con92 Matt Leonard, Government Leans into Machine Learning, GCN (Aug. 19,
2018), https://gcn.com/articles/2018/08/17/machine-learning.aspx [https://
perma.cc/5JBY-NJQF].
93 See, e.g., Hous. Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist.,
251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176-77 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (arguing that the machine-

learning tool used to evaluate, and potentially terminate, teachers violated procedural due process).
94
95

Lecher, supra note 14.

It is described in more detail in Brant E. Fries, Lisa R. Shugarman, John N.
Morris, Samuel E. Simon & Mary James, A Screening Systemfor Michigan'sHomeand Community-Based Long-Term Care Programs, 42 GERONTOLOGIST 462, 467
(2002).
96

Lecher, supranote 14.

97

Complaint at 9, Ledgerwood v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., No. 60CV-17442 (filed Jan. 26, 2017).

98 Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 S.W.3d 336, 344-45 (Ark.
2017).
99 Lecher, supranote 14.
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dition."' 0 0 Similar concerns have been raised for the al10
gorithmic determinations of Medicaid eligibility. ' In the
machine-learning context, the existence of brittleness raises
questions about the external validity of the classifier learned
from training data.1 0 2
A second domain in which large pools of government data
have been exploited to power algorithmic determinations about
specific individuals concerns the hiring and retention of public
schoolteachers. Again, this practice is illuminated by recent
litigation.
In 2010, the Houston Independent School District moved
to "data driven" teacher evaluation.1 0 3 It adopted the Educa0 4 EVAAS
tional Value-Added Assessment System (EVAAS).1
evaluates teachers by comparing their students' average test
score gains with statewide average gains to compute a "Teacher
Gain Index."1 0 5 A teachers' union, though, persuaded a district
court judge that due process was violated when a teacher was
fired for a low EVAAS score.1 0 6 It was impossible, the union
argued, for teachers to replicate their scores, even with access
to the algorithm's underlying code.1 0 7 Yet that score "might be
0 8 The
erroneously calculated for any number of reasons."1
School District settled the union's suit by disbursing backpay
and discontinuing EVAAS's use.1 0 9
Houston, however, is not alone in reaching for algorithmic
solutions in the hiring context. In 2015, the Atlanta Public
Schools retained the HireVue company to facilitate teacher hiring.11 0 HireVue offers deep-learning tools to extrapolate job
performance from facial features and interview performance
100 Id.
101 See Shein, supra note 89.
102 See supra text accompanying note 59 (discussing technical responses to
the problem of overfitting).
103 Hous. Fed'n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F.
Supp. 3d 1168, 1171 (S.D. Tex. 2017).
104 Id. at 1172.
105

Id.

106
107

See id. at 1180.
Id. at 1177.
Id.
Ian Sample, Computer Says No: Why Making Als Fair, Accountable and

108

109

Transparent Is Crucial, GUARDIAN (Nov. 5, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://
www.theguardian. com/ science/2017/nov/ 05/computer-says-no-why-makingais-fair-accountable-and-transparent-is-crucial [https://perma.cc/QB68-SNT5].
110 Atlanta Public Schools + HireVue: Hire A+ Teachers with HireVue Recruitment Software, HIREvUE, https://www.hirevue.com/customers/atlanta-publicschools-fills-vacancies-teacher-recruitment-software [https://perma.cc/BH9B6EJ3] (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) [hereinafter HireVue Hires Teachers].
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from online video interviews.111 HireVue's materials do not disclose how applicants are evaluated, but their description is
consistent with the use of affect-detection software.i1 2 Nor is it
clear whether the Atlanta school district (or other public authorities) is using HireVue's video capture functionality alone,
or its suite of predictive tools too.1 13
Other challengers to algorithmic allocations of state benefits have also turned to due process arguments. In Indiana, for
example, the automated rejection of a benefit application was
successfully challenged in 2012 on the due process ground
that the system provided recipients with insufficient information about the deprivations of important welfare benefits. 114 In
Michigan, the automated system for flagging fraudulent unemployment benefit applications was challenged on the ground
that the system "provide[d] no notice of the allegations brought
against them, and that this lack of notice, among other systemic problems, deprives claimants of a fair hearing."11 5 In
contrast, I have not been able to find examples of challenges to
algorithmic allocation systems based on equality or privacy
concerns., This may be because due process claims are easier
to allege. They require information about how decisions appear
to be made and not how different groups experience classification decisions or how data is handled in a back-office context.
Alternatively, the gap might be because of the historical origins
of procedural due process in challenges to the allocation and
withdrawal of welfare benefits.11 6 This would mean due process challenges are more readily imagined than equality or pri1"' Hirevue Video Interview Software, HIREVUE, https://www.hirevue.com/
products/video-interviewing [https://perma.cc/XAT5-L877] (last visited Sept. 25,
2020); Loren Larsen, HireVue Assessments and Preventing Algorithmic Bias,
HIREVUE (June 21, 2018), https://www.hirevue.com/blog/hirevue-assessmentsand-preventing-algorithmic-bias [https://perma.cc/JQB3-UX5Y]. The HireVue
site does not disclose what kind of machine-learning tool the company uses. See
HireVue Video Interview Software, supra note 111. But the general description
fits the use of deep learning to track elements of facial motion and thereby to
create composite scores for various kinds of affect. How this relates to teacher

quality is an unexplored question.
112 See infra text accompanying notes 194-195 (discussing this possibility).
113

114

See HireVue Hires Teachers, supra note 110.
Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Ind. 2012) (finding that "due

process requires a more detailed explanation of the reasons underlying an adverse
determination").
1"5 Zynda v. Arwood, 175 F. Supp. 3d 791, 799 (E.D. Mich. 2016).
116 Maggie McKinley, Petitioningand the Making of the Administrative State,
127 YALE L.J. 1538, 1624 (2018) ("In a series of cases in the 1970s, litigated

largely in the context of public benefits, the Court developed a test for administrative due process .... ").
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vacy ones. It would not necessarily mean that due process
problems are more common.
Nevertheless, the racial or privacy effects of benefit distributions may well also be real.1 17 To see why, consider work by
Khiara Bridges on the intersection of informational privacy and
the welfare regime for poor mothers. Bridges's analysis does
not concern computational decision tools per se but nonetheless illuminates the possibility of important yet unaddressed
normative questions arising from the use of algorithms to allocate public benefits." She underscores the extent to which
state aid to poor mothers is conditioned on the disclosure of a
good deal of personal information about a mother's behavior
and her social context.' 19 This deprivation of privacy, Bridges
contends, cannot be explained by a concern about the health or
well-being of either mother or child. She instead reasons that it
"would not even be attempted without the baseline supposition
about the group to which she belongs."120 Bridges's argument
resonates with a longer line of sociological and political science
work emphasizing how racial stereotypes have tended to shape
welfare policy.1 2 1 But the normative concerns she raises may
become increasing relevant in the algorithmic context. The
public entities that collect information used for algorithmic allocation of benefits, for example, may be more vulnerable to
data breaches than private entities such as commercial
banks.1 2 2 This would mean that an increasing reliance on
those tools for benefit allocations will likely shift more of the

117 In May 2019, the Illinois General Legislature passed the Artificial Intelligence video Interview Act. See H.B. 2557, 101st Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2019), https:/

/www.ilga.gov/legislation/101/HB/PDF/10100HB25571v.pdf [https://perma.
cc/W3SA-SA77]; IL HB2557, BILL TRACK 50, https://www.billtrack5O.com/Bill
Detail/ 1067171 [https://perma.cc/UXB2-SPUE]. The measure, which the governor signed into law in August 2019, imposes notice and consent rules on the use
of such tools and also allows applicants to request that their video interviews be
destroyed within thirty days of the interview. The act would also limit the sharing
of such videos. See H.B. 2557.
118
See KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS 5-6, 8-11 (2017).
119 Id. at 1-5.
120

Id at 149.
See MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE
POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY 102 (1999) (describing the racialization of opposi121

tion to welfare spending, which has "reflected a preexisting stereotype of blacks as
lazy").

122 See Danielle Keats Citron, A Poor Mother's Right to Privacy: A Review, 98
B.U. L. REV. 1139, 1147 (2018) ("A common source of data breaches involves
public hospitals where the personal data of poor mothers is collected and
stored.").
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burden of data-breach risk to the indigent. 12 3 Machine learning's adoption would then have a regressive and racially disparate economic impact as well as imposing a burden upon
privacy rights.
3.

Machine Learning and the Punitive State: Facial
Recognition as a Case Study

The third domain in which machine learning is increasingly used involves the provision of public security through
policing, incarceration, and (in the most extreme cases) force.
There is already a large body of literature on how machine
learning is deployed in policing, 12 4 bail and arraignment proceedings, 125 and sentencing. 1 26 This literature depicts how
machine-learning tools and other algorithms are used to generate predictions of future violence or criminality. Locationbased predictions, such as those generated by policing applications like PredPol, are used to allocate investigative resources. 1 2 7 Other predictions can focus on specific
individuals. The COMPAS algorithm, for instance, is used in
many jurisdictions to facilitate bail determinations by generating a risk score from one to ten for defendants, a score that
123 To be clear, this theory has not been tested empirically; I raise it here as a
possibility to be evaluated through regulation or litigation.
124

See, e.g., Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable

Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REv. 327, 383-85 (2015) (providing a careful catalogue of
predictive policing tools); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing,
94 WASH. U. L. REv. 1109, 1120-44 (2017) (similar); see also Michael L. Rich,
Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the Fourth Amendment,

164 U. PA. L. REV. 871, 929 (2016) (developing a "framework" for integrating
machine-learning technologies into Fourth Amendment analysis).
125 See Richard A. Berk, Susan B. Sorenson & Geoffrey Barnes, Forecasting
Domestic Violence: A Machine LearningApproach To Help Inform Arraignment Decisions, 13 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 94, 110 (2016) (reporting experimental results
suggesting gains from machine learning prediction of violence risk); Richard Berk
& Jordan Hyatt, Machine Learning Forecasts of Risk to Inform Sentencing Decisions, 27 FED. SENT'G REP. 222, 223 (2015) (explaining advantages of machine-

learning tools); Richard F. Lowden, Risk Assessment Algorithms: The Answer to an
InequitableBall System?, 19 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 221, 230-31 (2018) (listing
jurisdictions that have adopted algorithmic tools).
126 Richard Berk, An Impact Assessment of Machine Learning Risk Forecasts
on Parole Board Decisions and Recidivism, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 193,
195 (2017) (discussing the 2010 decision of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation
and Parole to use a machine-learning protocol to generate forecasts of recidivism).
See generally John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal
Sentencing, 12 ANN. REV. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 489, 493-95 (2016) (describing the
general context of risk assessment in sentencing).
127 Aaron Shapiro, Reform Predictive Policing, 541 NATURE 458, 459 (2017).
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provides guidance to a magistrate judge charged with setting or
denying bail. 1 2 8
Rather than retreading details of predictive policing and
bail algorithms that have been well covered elsewhere, I focus
here on a new frontier in the law enforcement deployment of
machine learning. This is use of facial recognition technologies
to identify individuals from public surveillance and body-camera footage. 129 Facial recognition technologies provide a useful
case study of the complex and unpredictable ways that norms
of procedural fairness, equality, and privacy interact when the
state deploys machine-learning tools to draw inferences from
otherwise unilluminating data.
Roughly half of all American adults are already profiled in
one or another American law enforcement agencies' facial-recognition database.1 3 0 These can be used to match with visual
evidence in specific cases and make arrests.131 More controversially, they can be used to identify participants of protests
against government policies.1 3 2 The rate of its adoption is uncertain. In May 2018, Axon-one of the largest manufacturers
of body-worn cameras in the United States-secured a patent
on real-time identification of faces caught on an officer's bodyworn camera.1 33 Then in June 2019, the company announced
128 EQUIVANT, PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO COMPAS CORE 1-2, 8 (2019), https://
www.equivant.com/wp-content/uploads/Practitioners-Guide-to-COMPAS-Core040419.pdf [https://perma.cc/PN7Q-59G5]; see also In re Hawthorne v. Stanford, 22 N.Y.S.3d 640, 641-42 (N.Y. App. Div. 2016) (describing the COMPAS

assessment tool).
129 Dakin Andone, Police Used Facial Recognition to Identify the Capital Gazette Shooter. Here's How It Works, CNN (June 29, 2018, 6:22 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2018/06/29/us/facial-recognition-technology-law-enforcement/
index.html [https://perma.cc/HL2R-487J].
130 CLARE GARVIE, ALVARO M. BEDOYA, & JONATHAN FRANKLE, GEORGETOWN LAW
CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH., THE PERPETUAL LINE-UP: UNREGULATED POLICE FACE RECOGNITION IN AMERICA 1 (2016), https://www.perpetuallineup.org/sites/default/files/
2
0Privacy
2016-12 /The%20Perpetual%20Line-Up%20-%20Center%200n%C
2

%C20and%C20Technology%20at%20Georgetown%C20Law%20% 0121616.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EK75-6HRG].
131 See, e.g., State v. Alvarez, No. A-5587-13T2, 2015 N.J. Super. Unpub.
LEXIS 1024, at *1-2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. May 4, 2015) (searching every

image in the state's repository to determine if individuals were maintaining more
than one identification document).
132 See, e.g., Kevin Rector & Alison Knezevich, Maryland's Use of Facial Recognition Software Questioned by Researchers, Civil Liberties Advocates, BALT. SUN
(Oct. 18, 2016, 12:01 AM), https://www.baltimoresun.com/news/crime/bs-md-

facial-recognition-20161017-story.html [https://perma.cc/U5ER-SC3E] (noting
that Maryland's image repository was used to monitor protestors during Baltimore protests).
133 Alex Pasternack, Body Camera Maker Will Let Cops Live-Stream Their Encounters,

FAST

COMPANY

(Oct.

8,

2018),

https://www.fastcompany.com/
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that it was not installing the tool because of reliability concerns. 13 4 For now, individualized facial-recognition results
may not reach officers at a time and in a manner that permits
them to act upon the data. But this equilibrium is unlikely to
hold.
Facial recognition raises interrelated privacy, procedural
fairness, and equality concerns. Consider a much-publicized
2015 study using eight facial traits to identify specific persons. 13 5 Finding no duplicates among a sample of 3,982 facial
images provided by the U.S. Army, it favorably compared the
accuracy of facial recognition to that of DNA matching.1 3 6 A
2019 paper, however, observed that this result rested on untested assumption about the statistical distribution of certain
parameter values for those traits.1 3 7 It doubted the external
validity of the 2015 study. That research, for instance, assumed that human faces are static and unchanging over time.
But "ageing, illness, tiredness, the expressions we're pulling or
how our faces are distorted by a camera angle" all can alter the
values of the eight facial traits.13 8 Even if facial recognition
were accurate under ideal conditions, police deploy it under
nonideal conditions. They indeed use it in rather creative
ways. Hence, in New York City, when officers had a partial
surveillance shot of a face from a pharmacy larceny, they used
a high-quality video image of the actor Woody Harrelson to find
matches on the theory that the partial image from the surveillance video looked like Harrelson.1 3 9
Patterns of error rates in lab-based facial recognition systems are also uneven across racial, gender, and age lines. This
is a consequence of using predominantly older, more male and
whiter exemplars in training data. One 2018 study of two com90247228/axon-new-body-cameras-will-live-stream-police-encounters [https://
perma.cc/845M-D4KG].
134
Charlie Warzel, A Major Police Body Cam Company Just Banned Facial
Recognition, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/
27/opinion/police-cam-facial-recognition.html [https://perma.cc/vNP2-YGR4].

&

135 Teghan Lucas & Maciej Henneberg, Are Human Faces Unique? A Metric
Approach to Finding Single Individuals Without Duplicates in Large Samples, 257
FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 514.e1, 514.e5 (2015).
136 Id. at 514.e2, e6.
137 Ronald Meester, Bart Preneel, & Sylvia wenmackers, Reply to Lucas
Henneberg: Are Human Faces Unique?, 297 FORENSIC SCL INT'L 217, 218-20
(2019).
138

139
(May

FRY, supranote 35, at 163.
Clare Garvie, Garbage In, Garbage Out, GEO. L. CTR. ON PRIVACY & TECH.
16,

2019), https://www.flawedfacedata.com/

[https://perma.cc/242U-

YEP9]. It is not clear, however, how common use misuses are; anecdotal data is a
risky basis of a judgment as to whether there is a real problem.
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mercially available facial-recognition tools, IJB-A and Adience,
for example, found that both were trained on predominantly
white subjects and had errors rates for Black women that were
34.7 percent higher than for white men.1 4 0 In respect to privacy, there is little regulation under federal or state law of the
inferences police draw from facial images. There is also some
evidence that facial images allow for "category-jumping" inferences about health. For instance, they may enable predictions
of postpartum depression from expectant mothers' prenatal
image postings. 141
Facial recognition can also be misused in stark ways. A
2016 study by two Chinese researchers used a training set of
1,856 photos of Chinese men to construct a predictive tool to
distinguish two "manifolds" of "criminal" and "non-criminal"
face types.1 4 2 Their result was extensively criticized. Their
small sample of training data, for example, made overfitting
difficult to avoid.1 4 3 Many of their noncriminal faces (but none
of the criminal faces) wore white collared shirts, introducing a
likely confound. Still, it is not far-fetched to envisage police
forces generating "criminal type" lists now based on such uses
of facial recognition tools-much as they have tried to use social networks (unavailingly) to create "strategic subject lists" of
likely future criminals.144 However flawed the resulting inferences, they might nonetheless sharply inflect police practice.
140

Joy Buolamwini & Timnit Gebru, Gender Shades: IntersectionalAccuracy

Disparities in Commercial Gender Classftcation, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES.

1, 3, 11-12 (2018); see also Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. 633, 680 (2017) ("[A]lgorithms that include some type of machine
learning can lead to discriminatory results if the algorithms are trained on historical examples that reflect past prejudice or implicit bias . . . ."); Kate Crawford,
Artificial Intelligence's White Guy Problem, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2016), https://
www.nytimes.com/2016/06/26/opinion/sunday/artificial-intelligences-whiteguy-problem.html [https://perma.cc/AHC5-Q9WT] (noting that sexism, racism,
and other forms of discrimination are often built into machine learning). Note
that the distributive effects of differential error rates depend on the ratio of false
positives and false negatives.
141 Eric Horvitz & Deirdre Mulligan, Data, Privacy, and the Greater Good, 349
SCIENCE 253, 253 (2015).
142

Xiaolin wu & Xi Zhang, Automated Inference on Criminality Using Face

Images 2-3 (Nov. 13, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/
1611.04135v1.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3KQ-ZX3B}.
143 Agfiera y Arcas et al., supra note 45.
144 See Jeremy Gorner, Chicago Police Use 'Heat List' as Strategy to Prevent
Violence, CHI. TRIB. (Aug. 21, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-0821 /news/ct-met-heat-list-2013082 1 Lchicago-police-commander-andrewpapachristos-heat-list [https://perma.cc/DE7Y-Q4LX]. The Chicago "heat list,"
however, proved to have little or no predictive value. Jessica Saunders, Priscillia
Hunt, & John S. Hollywood, Predictions Put into Practice:A Quasi-Experimental
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There is little litigation testing the constitutional constraints on algorithmic decision making in the criminal justice
context. 14 5 The case law that does exist focuses on due process
questions, touches briefly on equality concerns, and largely
ignores privacy values.1 4 6 One reason for this is the absence of
effective vehicles for raising legal challenges to machine-learning instruments in the criminal justice context. When it comes
to policing, for example, it would be difficult for an individual
litigant to challenge the use of a machine-learning tool to allocate policing resources so long the legal basis for his or her
encounter with the police was constitutionally sufficient.1 4 7 In
addition, systemic challenges filed as class actions to the allocation of policing resources over different geographic spaces
are exceedingly rare.1 4 8 Costly to investigate and litigate, they
are likely to founder on questions of Article III standing and
amenability to Rule 23 class-based resolution.
Some cases have arisen in the context of individualized
risk evaluations in pretrial and sentencing. In 2016, for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected a due process chalEvaluation of Chicago's Predictive Policing Pilot, 12 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY
347, 363 (2016).

145 One reason may be the successful exercise of trade secrets objections by
the commercial manufacturers of algorithms. Rebecca Wexler, Life, Liberty, and
Trade Secrets: IntellectualProperty in the CriminalJustice System, 70 STAN. L. REV.
1343, 1349-53 (2018) (arguing that such trade secrets invocations pose a real
problem and contending that new transparency mechanisms are required). Many
commonly used machine-learning tools are, in fact, quite simple to program in a
common language such as R. See, e.g., Random Forests, UC Bus. ANALYncS R
PROGRAMMING GUIDE, https://uc-r.github.io/random

forests

[https://perma.cc/

5J4Q-G9F5] (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) (providing an introduction to random
forests using R). Claims to the effect that the basic method (be it random forests,
naive Bayes, or even a neutral net) is somehow bespoke and hence worthy of trade
secrets protection are probably bunk. What is more distinctive is the manner of
regularization and empirical testing used to tweak the rule learned by the algorithm to avoid overfitting or achieve other ends. For example, a model might be
adjusted to avoid predictions that correlate too closely with race or gender.
146 On the possibility of a Fifth Amendment challenge to interviews designed to
elicit information from a defendant for the purpose of assigning him or her an
algorithmic classification, see Cassie Deskus, Note, Fifth Amendment Limitations
on Criminal Algorithmic Decision-Making, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 237,
259-66 (2018).
147 Under Fourth Amendment doctrine, the availability of a legal justification
for a police stop obviates any argument that it should be treated as unlawful
because of the actual causes of or justifications for the stop. See Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (rejecting "any argument that the constitutional
reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of the individual
officers involved").
148 For a rare exception, see Cent. Austin Neighborhood Ass'n v. City of Chicago, 1 N.E.3d 976, 978, 984 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013) (challenging the failure to provide
resources to minority neighborhoods in Chicago).
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lenge to the COMPAS algorithm based on the defendant's
limited ability to challenge the algorithm in broad and general
terms, rather than being able to scrutinize the individualized
data upon which the algorithm relied in a specific instance. 14 9
The Court reasoned that the algorithm relied on publicly available data alone. It observed that the defendant could have
denied or explained any information used to craft his prediction.1 50 In passing, the Court noted that traits such as gender
were among the large set of inputs to the defendant's sentence. 15 1 On their own, the Court cautioned, such factors "may
not be considered as the determinative factor in deciding
whether the offender can be supervised safely and effectively in
the community" consistent with due process.1 5 2
While lawsuits challenging the use of facial recognition
have not yet been lodged, regulatory responses have been set in
motion. In May 2019, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors
voted to prohibit police adoption or implementation of facial
recognition technologies. 153 A raft of other cities, including
New York, Las Vegas, Detroit, Boston, and Orlando, have nevertheless embraced the technology. They show no sign of willingness to abandon it. New York City has enacted an
ordinance creating an expert board to monitor and make recommendations about how algorithmic technologies are to be
deployed.1 5 4 It remains to be seen how such a body would
operate and whether it will be able to take on a powerful interest group such as the police.
The Wisconsin decision, like the Arkansas challenge to disability allocation algorithms and the Houston challenge to
teacher evaluations, turned almost exclusively on procedural
concerns. Yet even as a contentious literature has emerged

149

State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 761-62 (Wis. 2016).

150

Icd

151

Id. at 765 ("[T]he due process implications compel us to caution circuit
courts that because COMPAS risk assessment scores are based on group data,
they are able to identify groups of high-risk offenders-not a particular high-risk
individual.").
152 Id. at 760.
153
Kate Conger, Richard Fausset & Serge F. Kovaleski, San Francisco Bans
FacialRecognition Technology, N.Y. TmEs (May, 14, 2019), https://www.nytimes.
com/2019/05/14/us/facial-recognition-ban-san-francisco.html
[https://
perma.cc/74JD-4KZX.
154 Local Law No. 49, N.Y. City Council (N.Y. 2018), https://egistar.council.
nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3137815&GUID=437A6A6D-62E 1-47E29C42-461253F9C6D0 [https://perma.cc/D68B-JMMG] (creating a task force
charged with investigating "agency automated decision systems").
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analyzing the role of race in the COMPAS algorithm,1 5 5 to date
there has been no litigation explicitly challenging those effects.
Similarly, there is a dearth of academic or judicial treatment of
the privacy-related risks from the creation of large aggregates
of data for public security purposes. Still, even if police forces
have more resources at their disposal than (say) public hospitals, there is no reason to think that they will be inured to the
risk of data breaches.

Machine-learning tools are rapidly diffusing across both
civil and criminal regulatory domains. They are at the moment
sporadically regulated. They consistently raise, however, a
common cluster of procedural due process, equality, and privacy concerns. Courts and commentators have glimpsed these
concerns. But judges to date have neither offered a coherent
account of how they are interlaced nor of how they can be
identified, let alone mitigated.
II
APPLYING CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES IN THE MACHINELEARNING STATE

Given the rapid and ongoing adoption of machine-learning
technologies by federal and state authorities, how should constitutional interests be recalibrated to fit the new terrain fashioned by the machine-learning state? This Part focuses on due
process, equality, and privacy values, three constitutional
norms repeatedly implicated in the design and operation of
predictive tools. It analyzes difficulties that arise in their application to the machine-learning state.
A.

Procedural Due Process

A common complaint lodged in court against machinelearning instruments is their failure to give regulated subjects
procedural due process.1 56 Anecdotal accounts abound of in155
See Huq, supra note 10, at 1047-57 (discussing different definitions of
racial disparities in algorithmic classification and suggesting why a definition
focused on the potential for stratifying effects is most desirable). For a different
analysis, albeit one that is critical of COMPAS in a different way, see Julia Angwin,

Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner, Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23,

2016), https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-incriminal-sentencing [https://perma.cc/Z9JF--LCFY].
156 Due process concerns are central in several cases. See, e.g., Hous. Fed'n of
Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1171 (S.D.

Tex. 2017) (arguing that the teacher evaluation algorithm deprived teachers of
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dividuals who have been wrongly classified by an algorithm
when the error could have been quickly and easily fixed by
human attention. In an influential treatment, for example,
data scientist Cathy O'Neill describes an applicant for a welfare
benefit who fails an automated, "web-crawling[,] data-gathering" background check. 15 7 It is only when "one conscientious
human being" took the trouble to look into the quality of this
machine result that error was discovered and corrected. 158 The
implication is that machines are prone to error and that a
hearing of sorts before a human adjudicator is a necessary
adjustment to any algorithmically driven process.
A granular focus on error in the isolated case, however, is
an untrustworthy vehicle for the purposes of due process analysis. I shall argue instead that due process is violated when an
algorithm fails to achieve an adequate level of accuracy across
the population of regulated cases. Due process concerns hence
arise from the calibration of design margins in ways that make
relevant errors more rather than less likely. A constitutional
analysis must therefore focus upon algorithmic design choices
remote in time from the instant in which a human is subject to
algorithmic classification. Remedies for a due process deficit
are unlikely to take the form of additional human review but
rather better algorithmic design. I identify a number of relevant design margins in this spirit. I also emphasize that it is
not always possible to eliminate equally false negatives and
false positives. A choice, rather, must be made about which to
endure. Due process in the algorithmic context-where it is
possible to precisely specify ex ante the balance and kind of
errors-thus entails normative judgments about the relative
cost of different sorts of errors. Although those judgments are
implicitly embedded in human decision-making process, they
can be isolated and addressed with greater precision in the
machine-decision context.

due process protections against substantively unfair deprivations of property);
State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 760 (Wis. 2016) (arguing that COMPAS risk

assessment violated the defendant's right to be sentenced based on accurate
information). The challenge to Arkansas's automated disability determinations
sounds in state administrative law but relied on a notice concern familiar to due
process jurisprudence. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Ledgerwood, 530 S.W.3d
336, 344-45 (Ark. 2017).
157
CATHY O'NEILL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: How BIG DATA INCREASES
INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY 152-53 (2016).
158 Id. at 153.
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ProceduralDue Process Norms

The doctrinally dominant model of procedural due process
is narrowly "utilitarian" in its focus on "attaining the most accurate conclusion in the most efficient manner."1 5 9 "Accuracy," in the due process context, is understood to mean a
correlation between a decision procedure's outcomes and some
empirical ground truth.1 6 0 Alternative conceptions hinging on
dignity and the intrinsic value of participation have not gained
doctrinal purchase. 16 1 This instrumental, accuracy-focused
account of due process crystallized in the famous three-part
test announced in Mathews v. Eldridge.16 2 The Court here directed attention to "the private interest," the estimated "risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest" combined with "the
probable value ... of additional or substitute procedural safeguards," and "the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that
the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail." 6 3 These factors are properly considered by looking at
adjudicative mechanisms as a whole rather than at the specifics of a single case. In this sense, due process challenges commonly have the flavor of a facial challenge.
In application, the Mathews test relies on difficult, perhaps
irremediably hard, counterfactual questions about the state's
election between potential alternative institutional arrangements, private individuals' behavior under alternative adjudicatory arrangements, and the expected gains to accuracy from

&

159 Martin H. Redish, Discovery Cost Allocation, Due Process, and the Constitution's Role in Civil Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REv. 1847, 1863-64 (2018).
160 An alternative conception of accuracy would focus on the expression of
confidence (uncertainty) in classifications. See Robert J. MacCoun, The Epistemic
Contract:Fostering an Appropriate Level of Public Trust in Experts, in MOTIVATING
COOPERATION AND COMPLIANCE WITH AUTHORIY 191, 201-02 (BrianH. Bornstein
Alan J. Tomkins eds., 2015). Although I do not purpose MacCoun's proposal at
length, I do later explain how uncertainty and accuracy interact in a functionally
important way. See infra text accompanying note 185 (discussing the bias/variance trade-off).
161 The dignity rationale is vigorously defended in scholarship. See, e.g.,
Frank I. Michelman, Formaland AssociationalAims in ProceduralDue Process, in
DUE PROCESS: NOMos XVIII, at 126, 127-28 (J. Roland Pennock & John w. Chapman eds., 1977) (underscoring participation values as an element of due process);
Jerry L. Mashaw, Administrative Due Process:The Questfor a DignitaryTheory, 61
B.U. L. REV. 885, 899 (1981) (advancing a dignitary theory of due process); Martin
H. Redish & Lawrence C. Marshall, Adjudicatory Independence and the Values of
ProceduralDue Process, 95 YALE L.J. 455, 504 (1986) (advocating for an independent adjudicator to protect procedural due process).
162 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
163 Id.
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marginal changes to those arrangements. 16 4 Its categorical exclusion of noninstrumental considerations from due process
analysis has also been controversial. But the test has remained good law for almost fifty years. It can logically be applied in new contexts, including those where machine learning
is in use. Indeed, I will suggest that the holistic Mathews test
may well be easier to apply in the latter context than in many of
the institutional domains in which it has previously been
wielded.
2.

Application to Machine Learning

Scholarship concerned with the procedural quality of algorithmic decision making have read Mathews to demand that
specific notice be given to regulated subjects and that an individualized determination, often involving a human adjudicator,
be available. In an early analysis, Danielle Keats Citron argued
that constitutionally adequate notice is supplied by an audit
trail documenting all "decisions made in a case" and "the actual rules applied in every mini-decision that the system
makes." 16 5 Developing the idea of a hearing right against machine decisions, Citron focused on scenarios in which a human
adjudicator is supplied with an algorithmic recommendation
and recommended that "agencies should require hearing officers to explain, in detail, their reliance on an automated system's decision." 16 6 This assumes the availability of human
intervention after an instrument has been applied to a specific
case.
In a similar vein, Kate Crawford and Jason Schultz have
pressed for "procedural data due process [to] regulate the fairness of Big Data's analytical processes with regard to how they
use personal data (or metadata . . . )."167 Like Citron, they
seem to conceptualize the entailment of due process in granular, individualistic terms. Notice, in their view, entails disclosure of the "type of predictions" and "the general sources of
data" used in the algorithm. 16 8 They too would require a hear164 Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search of a Theory of
Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 46-51 (1976) (offering these critiques in a somewhat
looser formulation).
165 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV.
1249, 1305 (2008).

166 Id. at 1307; cf. id. at 1284 (rejecting the idea that due process would
require access to source code).
167

Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward A

Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 109 (2014).
168

Id. at 125.
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ing, in which an affected person could examine the "data input
and the algorithmic logic applied," and then appeal to a "neutral data arbiter" (presumably, a human rather than another
machine) to resolve disputes about the quality of analysis and
prediction.1 6 9 It is not clear whether Crawford and Schultz
think that due process also requires disclosure of (1) the data
used in the training and generation of the learned rule or (2) the
data about the regulated subject used to make a prediction or
classification.
In a somewhat similar vein, Cary Coglianese and David
Lehr explicated notice by recommending that individuals receive information "collected about them" and "information
about how accurate the algorithm is across individuals when
evaluated in a test data set."1 7 0
The focus of these proposals upon a human appeal of individual cases may, however, miss the best way to vindicate due
process interests for a number of reasons. First, as David Lehr
and Paul Ohm explain, there are "many ways in which data can
be selected and shaped-say, during data cleaning or model
training"-that undermine the quality of predictions.171 Deviations from a tolerably accurate pattern of predictions can result
from the design of the training data, the outcome variable selection, or the choice of algorithmic instrument.1 72 The individualized hearing model, however, is not well suited to the
identification of such systemic problems. Providing an individualized hearing right to all regulated subjects is a good way of
providing attention to whether a particular person has been
correctly classified. Litigants will not necessarily have incentives, however, to uncover systemic problems (as opposed to
highlighting errors in their case). Their retail challenges are
hence not necessarily a good way to determine whether there is
a problem of inaccuracy-generating flaws in an algorithmic decision-making process. 173 Indeed, the fact that there is error in
a specific individual case before an adjudicator is not necessarily evidence of a systemic design problem since most algorithms produce some errors. And once systemic flaws are
169
170

Id. at 127.

Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 72, at 41.
171 Lehr & Ohm, supra note 47, at 656.
172 See, e.g., Altenburger & Ho, supranote 73, at 99-100 (exploring how bias
in training data can be minimized by the choice of appropriate computational
architecture).

173 It is not impossible for individualized hearings to provide a vehicle for
reviewing systemic problems. But it hard to see how this could be a cost-effective
approach.
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rooted out, individualized hearings may be an unnecessarily
costly enterprise.
Second, a common assumption of these proposals is that
adding human appeals reduces overall rates of false positives
and false negatives. But I have argued elsewhere that it is
problematic to assume that human decision making is generally more accurate than machine classification or that adding a
human appeal to a machine decision will reduce error rates. 17 4
I was not making a new point. Writing in 1954, the psychologist Paul Meehl compared statistical prediction tools with
clinical judgments by trained specialists and came to the conclusion that structured decision making was better (even then)
than either humans acting alone or statistical prediction coupled to human review.1 7 5 Recent studies also suggest that adding human oversight to structured (algorithmic decisions) will
not always reduce the net volume of false positives and false
negatives and instead will often have undesirable, even perverse, effects.1 76 While the possibility of a system that successfully integrated post hoc human oversight with machine
decisions cannot be ruled out categorically, current proposals
that focus on a "hearing officer" are more likely to exacerbate
rather than resolve this due process concern.
3.

Testing Algorithmic Design Against Due Process Norms

In the spirit of Crawford and Schultz, I would instead focus
due process analysis on systemic design choices. They, however, provide insufficient detail of how design might compromise due process and how to go about identifying problematic
design features. To start filling that gap, I explore here five
distinct due process problems that can arise through algorithmic design. All hinge on systemic properties of the machine-learning tool.

&

174 Aziz Z. Huq, A Right to a Human Decision, 105 VA. L. REv. (forthcoming
2020) (manuscript at 2), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3382521 [https://
perma.cc/G7F8-ZWZC); accord Sharad Goel, Ravi Shroff, Jennifer Skeem
Christopher Slobogin, The Accuracy, Equity, and Jurisprudence of Criminal Risk
Assessment 3 (Dec. 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (summarizing evidence that additional process can have aggregate negative effects on
accuracy).
175

PAUL E. MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION 119-20,

136-38

(1954) (predicting that mechanical predictive methods would outperform clinical
ones).
176 Thomas H. Cohen, Bailey Pendergast, & Scott w. VanBenschoten, Examining Overrides of Risk Classifications for Offenders on Federal Supervision, 80 FED.
PROB. 12, 20-21 (2016); R. Karl Hanson & Kelly E. Morton-Bourgon, The Charac-

teristics of Persistent Sexual Offenders: A Meta-Analysis of Recidivism Studies, 73
J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1154, 1154-56, 1159 (2005).
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First, an algorithm might be trained on data that is incomplete, biased, or flawed because of the way that it has been
created, selected, or cleaned. 17 7 Training data produced by
state enforcement agencies, such as police or child welfare services, might be shaped by the implicit or explicit bias either of
officials or those who provide leads.1 78 The result may be an
excessive representation of some groups (e.g., racial minorities), not as a consequence of higher misbehavior rates but
rather because of the greater propensity of others to report or
investigate them. Alternatively, training data might have
"black holes" as a consequence of the state's failure to enforce
the law in certain locations or against certain populations. 17 9
Again, the predictable consequences of such flaws is the deviation of predictions from whatever latent construct (e.g., criminality, the risk of benefit ineligibility, or the probability of child
abuse) that is the intended object of state intervention. Due
process requires at a minimum that an algorithm's designer
avoid the unnecessary use of flawed datasets and, where appropriate, take active steps to mitigate training data flaws. 180

177 See ALPAYDIN, supra note 38, at 40 (describing the use of training and
validation data in algorithm design); Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99
MINN. L. REv. 535, 561 (2014) (arguing that databases contain errors because of
their "sheer size[,] ... the automatic and indiscriminate information-gathering
that is a hallmark of the big data method[, and] ... errors [that] manifest when
error-free data from different sources is merged").
178 A further problem is that "race is such a dominant category in the cognitive
field that the 'interim solution' [of using race as a proxy for some other trait of
interest] can leave its own indelible mark .... " Troy Duster, Race and Reification
in Science, 307 SCIENCE 1050, 1050 (2005). This means that race might well
structure the past deployment of state resources, or patterns of private behavior,
in ways that are hard to disentangle from readily available training data.
179 Kate Crawford, The Anxieties of Big Data, NEW INQUIRY (May 30, 2014),
https://thenewinqury.com/the-anxieties-of-big-data [https://perma.cc/WV3C865M].
180 Imagine that an algorithm is accurate for a majority of a regulated population but errs at very high rate for a specific subgroup. Imagine further that this
subgroup is not a protected class, defined by race or class. Can members of the
nonsuspect class thereby created complain of a due process violation? Cf Ian
Ayres, Outcome Tests of Racial Disparitiesin Police Practices, 4 JUST. RES. & POL'Y

131, 139 (2002) (describing this problem). Whether this presents a constitutional
problem depends on how costly the subgroup error is to fix for the balance of the
population. Where the error cannot be mitigated without introducing greater
rates of error elsewhere, for example, due process would not be compromised.
But it is worth asking whether it would be minimally rational for the state to
continue to use the algorithm in question against the subgroup if it is known that
the tool is serially inaccurate. It may be, though, that the state could proffer a
reason for not permitting an opt-out (e.g., membership in the subgroup is costly to
determine ex ante, and hence it is cheaper to keep the subgroup in). I am grateful
to Julian Nyarko for conversations on this point.
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Second, an outcome variable may be poorly aligned with
variable of interest, which is commonly termed
underlying
the
the "latent construct."1 8 1 For instance, the outcome variable
may have been defined in terms of a feature that is not present
in the original data. Risk assessment algorithms in the criminal justice space, for example, are designed to predict "dangerousness"-a classification that is not present in the original
data.1 8 2 This synthetic classification, however, may not correlate well with the underlying outcome of interest for any number of reasons. 18 3 The institutional context in which an
algorithm is deployed may also influence the fit between an
outcome variable and the latent construct. Facial recognition
tools are already used to match on police artists' composites. 184
But those composites are likely to be highly imperfect versions
of the latent construct of interest: the face of the actual suspect. An algorithm that permits matching on artists' composites therefore introduces a stochastic element associated
with a predictably high and racially asymmetrical error rate.
Due process might be offended, more generally, by a poor
choice of latent construct.
Third, an algorithm's designer might elect a model that is
ill-fitted to the policy task at hand. One important election in
this regard relates to the important bias/variance trade-off.
Model choice, that is, influences a necessary and unavoidable
trade-off between bias (how far predictions are from ground
truth) and variance (in effect, how much a prediction would
vary if the learner was trained on different data sets). There is
some evidence that simpler models often perform better than
18 5
more sophisticated ones because they yield less variance.
181 Lehr & Ohm, supra note 47, at 679 ("Measurements must be faithful not
just to what a variable ostensibly indicates on its face, but also to what underlying
construct (also called a latent construct) the data scientist believes it
represents.").
Cf Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data's Disparate Impact, 104
182
CALIF. L. REv. 671, 679 (2016) (discussing how algorithms measure creditworthi-

ness, despite there being no direct way to measure creditworthiness).
183
For an argument that "dangerousness" in criminal justice contexts is infected with ideas of race, see Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The
Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27 FED. SENT'G REP. 237, 237 (2015).
184 Scott Mum, Hu Han, Anil K. Jain, & Brendan Klare, Sketch Based Face
Recognition: Forensic u. Composite Sketches, INT'L CONF. ON BIOMETRIcs 3 (2013),

https: / /www.researchgate.net/publication/
235701861 _Sketch_BasedFaceRecognitionForensic_vsCompositeSketches
[https://perma.cc/69JM-UBZW].
Pedro Domingos, A Unfied Bias-Variance Decompositionfor Zero-One and
185
Squared Loss, 2000 PROC. 17TH NAT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 564, 564;
see also Lehr & Ohm, supra note 47, at 697-98 (discussing bias/variance tradeoff in algorithmic design).
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Depending upon the policy context, different models may
be desirable based on how they manage this trade-off. Where
precision is less important than consistency as a policy matter,
the bias-variance trade-off implies that a model with higher
bias might be chosen with the expectation that it will produce a
certain rate of errors. Simply examining error rates to condemn or endorse an algorithm without understanding how
model choice pertains to policy functions, therefore, may lead a
due process analysis astray.
Fourth, an algorithm may be trained on appropriate training data, may initially offer useful predictions on the ground,
and then confront cases that defy proper classification. Given
the complex and evolving social circumstances in which algorithmic decision tools are likely to work, it is usually needful
to evaluate periodically an algorithm's performance to determine that its classifications continue to correspond to the latent variable. This concern may be what Coglianese and Lehr
are getting at when they advocate for disclosure of an algorithm's accuracy "in a test data set." 186 But their proposal
can be profitably extended to consideration of how an algorithm performs over time on the ground.
Finally, there is a class of cases in which there is no outcome variable available that is well enough correlated to the
underlying variable of interest. The algorithm's predictions,
therefore, are irrational in the sense of lacking any logical relationship to a legitimate state interest. 187 The problem of irrationality in formal enactments and administrative action has
generally been styled as an Equal Protection violation, rather
than a Due Process concern. 18 8 However that problem is
186

Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 12, at 1187.

I should distinguish this point from a similar one made in the literature.
Invoking a concern about rationality, for example, Citron has argued that certain
decisions "explicitly or implicitly require the exercise of human discretion." Citron, supra note 165, at 1302-04. My argument here is different. Citron's argument draws on the well-worn distinction between rules, which are given content
before regulated subjects act, and standards, which are given content after regulated subjects act. I think Citron's point is not technically correct as applied to
machine learning. There is no technical reason why an algorithmic tool cannot
classify new examples and thereby liquidate a standard. The k-nearest neighbor
(k-NN) algorithm, for example, classifies new instances by assigning the label that
187

most frequently occurs among the k training samples nearest to that query point.
188 Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 563-65 (2000) (per curiam)

(finding that the plaintiffs' allegation that the defendant's actions were "irrational
and wholly arbitrary" was "sufficient to state a claim for relief under traditional

equal protection analysis," "quite apart from the Village's subjective motivation"
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631-36 (1996)

(holding that Colorado's Amendment 2 "lack[ed] a rational relationship to legitimate state interests").
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phrased, it is plausible to say that a constitutional violation is
made out when an instrument's outcome variable has no plau18 9
sible correlation to the underlying outcome of interest.
Teacher evaluations and criminal risk assessments may be
cases in point. There is substantial evidence that many available measures of teacher performance, especially student evaluations, are distorted by various improper race- and genderrelated biases,1 9 0 or at the very least uncorrelated with measures of learning success. 19 1 Standardized test data, meanwhile, suffers from vulnerability to gamesmanship by other
teachers. As a result, measures of teacher effectiveness based
on such scores experience arbitrary fluctuations on a year-toyear basis.1 9 2 Given this, an algorithm trained on either student evaluations or standardized test scores may well be per se
invalid on either due process or equal protection grounds (as
inaccurate or because it impounds bias).
Or consider the HireVue tool, which may be in use by the
9 3 Apparently,
Atlanta Public Schools to hire teachers.1
HireVue uses a facial data analytic tool developed by Affectiva,
"a leading company in emotion recognition that works in market research and advertising."1 9 4 Even setting aside the doubts
that have been raised about the theoretical presuppositions of
affect recognition,1 9 5 it is not at all clear how affect, as detected
in facial images, is meaningfully predictive of performance as a
teacher. Such use of affect recognition in hiring is likely to
189 Cf. Barocas & Selbst, supranote 182, at 715 ("Disputes over the superiority of competing definitions are often insoluble because the target variables are
themselves incommensurable.").
190 See, e.g., Friederike Mengel, Jan Sauermann, & Ulf ZSlitz, Gender Bias in
Teaching Evaluations, 17 J. EUR. ECON. ASS'N 535, 563-64 (2019) (finding gender
bias in teacher evaluations).
191 See, e.g., Bob Uttl, Carmela A. White, & Daniela Wong Gonzalez, MetaAnalysis of Faculty's Teaching Effectiveness: Student Evaluation of Teaching Ratings and Student Learning Are Not Related, 54 STUD. EDUC. EVALUATON 22, 23,
38-40 (2017) (noting that any correlation between student evaluations and learning are flukes instead of due to students' abilities to assess instructors).
192 O'NEILL, supranote 157, at 135-40 (critiquing existing models of teacher
evaluation).
193 See supra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.
194 Patricia Nilsson, How AI Helps Recruiters Track Jobseekers'Emotions, FIN.
TIMES (Feb. 28, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/e2e85644-05be-11e8-96509cOad2d7c5b5 [https://perma.cc/X6JR-DG671.
195 See Marc A. Cohen, Against Basic Emotions, and Toward a Comprehensive
Theory, 26 J. MIND & BEHAV. 229, 240 (2005) (arguing that the "research does not
support the contention that there is a set of basic emotions"); Michael Price, Facial
Expressions-IncludingFear-May Not Be as Universal as We Thought, SCIENCE
(Oct. 18, 2016, 12:33 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/10/facialexpressions-including-fear-may-not-be-universal-we-thought [https://perma.cc/
R3RS-LE4Y] (discussing findings that Trobrianders use a gasp to convey anger).
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raise a serious question of rationality that, at least in the public
sector, has constitutional implications.
Whether criminal risk assessment for bail or probation is
ultimately feasible also remains contested. A group of scholars
have recently argued that violence risk is so small, even among
pretrial detainee populations, that it is statistically infeasible to
distinguish the minute number who will go on to commit acts
of violence.1 9 6 Moreover, these scholars argue, the training
data inevitably used for risk rating is inevitably affected by
animus.1 9 7 Other scholars have resisted this conclusion,
though,1 9 8 and instruments for predicting violence remain in
widespread use.
This list of potential design flaws whereby algorithmic design can go astray is, once again, not intended to be exclusive.
Rather, these examples merely illustrate some of the ways in
which algorithmic tools can fail to deliver low rates of error.
4.

Mathews and Machine Learning

The very possibility of specifying ex ante the conditions of
due process violation raises an intriguing possibility: Whereas
standard applications of the Mathews test to agency-based adjudicatory systems can flirt with indeterminacy, 199 its application may be straightforward and predictable in the machinelearning context. Discrete technological design margins can be
isolated and then analyzed for their contributions to error
rates. Almost fifty years after Mathews, that is, technology may
be finally making its doctrinal focus empirically tractable. But
at the same time, this tractability may also reveal difficulties
inherent in the Mathews test that until now have been occluded in its judicial application.
To make this more concrete, we can start with the observation that algorithmic tools make different kinds of errors. And
it will often be the case that it is technically infeasible to minimize both false positives and false negatives. 2 0 o Determining
196 Technical Flaws of Pretrial Risk Assessments Tools Raise Grave Concerns
2 (July 17, 2019), https://dam-prod.media.mit.edu/x/2019/07/16/Technical-

FlawsOfPretrial_ML%20site.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP6Q-DDF7].
197
198

Id. at 2-4.

See Goel, Shroff, Skeem & Slobogin, supranote 174, at 17 (endorsing risk
assessment instruments as superior to clinical predictions).
199 See Mashaw, supra note 164, at 46 (noting sources of indeterminacy).
200 For papers exploring the kinds of trade-offs implicit in algorithmic design,
see Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller, Sharad Goel, & Aziz Huq,
Algorithmic Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness, PROC. 23RD ACM SIGKDD
INT'L CONF. ON KNOWLEDGE DISCOVERY & DATA MINING 797, 804-05 (2017); Jon

Kleinberg, Sendhil Mullainathan, & Manish Raghavan, Inherent Trade-Offs in the
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the appropriate mix of false positives and false negatives, then,
will require difficult social and normative judgments. These
judgments are now often skirted or suppressed in practice. In
familiar applications of Mathews, these difficult judgments can
be elided. In the algorithmic context, however, they become
hard to avoid.
As an example of this, consider a binary classification regime, which has false positives and false negatives, rather than
a classifier that generates a continuous output variable, which
can make errors of degree. The first, binary case is more familiar in a legal context. Algorithmic design recognizes the different value of false positives and false negatives by allowing for
different weights to attach to each one. 2 0 1 Much as in the civil
and criminal trials false positives (negatives) are assigned different implicit weights by varying the burden of proof, that is,
so a computational tool can shift the balance between observed
false positives and false negatives. But how should due process be defined as between different mixes of false positives and
false negatives outside the criminal context? The social value
accorded to a false positive as opposed to a false negative in any
given situation is a matter of judgment. Wrongful convictions
are generally thought to be very costly; erroneous plaintiff verdicts in tort less s0.202 An evaluation of algorithmic due process requires a precise judgment of the relative costs
associated with a false negative and a false positive. 2 0 3 In respect to bail determinations, employment decisions, and welfare allocations, however, no consensus exists as to the relative
values of different error types. In consequence, determining
when due process is satisfied will compel an anterior policy
debate on the value of different kinds of errors in a given policy
domain.
In current practice, a "very common" solution is to assume
equal costs from false positives and false negatives. 2 0 4 But this
seems an implausible global solution. As a result of its displacement, the application of due process will entail difficult
judgments about the social costs of various outcomes subject
Fair Determination of Risk Scores, 8TH INNOVATIONS THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCI.
CONF., at 43:1, 43:4, 43:9, 43:17 (2016), https://arxv.org/pdf/1609.05807
[https://perma.cc/9L9J-QZLN].
201
202
203

Lehr & Ohm, supra note 47, at 690-94.

See In re winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
The ordinary application of Mathews entails a similar judgment. But algorithmic design allows one to calibrate a performance threshold for accuracy in
far more numerically precise terms than litigation would.
204 Hand, supra note 57.
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to regulation by prediction instruments. And that itself may
well be a costly and divisive enterprise.

Determining whether a machine-learning tool impinges on
due process demands an examination of the fit between quality
training data, the learning model, and outcome variable, and
the match between the outcome variable and the latent variable. In some ways, this is more difficult than reviewing human
decisions; in other ways, it is amenable to more precise
analysis.
Provided the fit between training data, learning model, outcome variable, and latent variable is sufficiently tight, a machine-learning tool should pass muster as a matter of due
process. I have described those margins, including both
choices about training data and methodological choice, in general and nontechnical terms. In many cases, moreover, it will
be possible to make judgments about how these design choices
were made without access to a classifier's source code. 2 0 5 The
nature of due process design margins, and their relative availability to ex post scrutiny, has implications for the analysis of
remedial frameworks offered in Part III.
B.

Equality and Antidiscrimination Norms

The American law of race and gender equality is embodied
in the constitutional jurisprudence of the Equal Protection
Clause and federal antidiscrimination statutes. 20 6 Constitutional law, which is my focus here, turns on questions of intent

and classification. I explore how these can be adapted to the
machine-learning context. I suggest, however, that the equality concerns commonly raised by algorithmic systems in practice are better conceptualized in terms of their impact on
pernicious social stratification. 2 0 7 In the following, I will focus
205 Cf. Kroll et al., supra note 140, at 638 (discussing the limits of source code
review).

206

Note that this standard formulation assumes the identity of equality and

antidiscrimination norms. In fact, the conceptual relationship between (different

kinds of) equality and antidiscrimination is a complex one. For an excellent
treatment, see generally Elisa Holmes, Anti-DiscriminationRights Without Equal-

ity,

68 MoD. L. REV. 175 (2005) (arguing that anti-discrimination rights do not

necessarily require equality).
207 This builds on an earlier critique, but I have tried not to repeat myself here.
Cf Huq, supra note 10, at 1101-02 (suggesting a need for substantial rethinking

of constitutional norms given the diffusion and adoption of machine-learning
tools).
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on racial equality norms, although many of the points I can
make can be transposed to other contexts.
1.

Equal Protection Norms

The constitutional law of equality takes intent and classification as central analytic terms. 2 0 8 Since the mid-1970s, the
Supreme Court has defined "the basic equal protection principle" under the Fourteenth Amendment to mean that "theinvidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must
2 0 9 It
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."
has also held that any occasion upon which "the government
distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial
2 10
classifications" will lead to the application of strict scrutiny.
To survive constitutional scrutiny, a classification's use must
21
be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 1
This anticlassification strand of the doctrine is justified on the
grounds that racial lines are "divisive" and purportedly rarely
relevant to a legitimate state purpose. 2 12
The concept of an impermissible "purpose" or intent, however, has not been defined with clarity. It can be construed in
208 Statutory antidiscrimination law, in contrast, also includes questions of
disparate impact and reasonable accommodation. Noah D. Zatz, Managing the
Macaw: Third-Party Harassers, Accommodation, and the Disaggregation of Discriminatory Intent, 109 COLUM. L. REv. 1357, 1368-69 (2009). For analyses of how
disparate impact liability can be re-articulated for a machine learning context,
see, for example, Barocas & Selbst, supra note 182, at 701-12 (arguing that the
disparate impact doctrine should look for discrimination in data mining); Huq,
supra note 10, at 1128-33 (arguing for a bifurcated classification rule in algorithmic criminal justice tools).
209 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976). Although the intent requirement is now perceived as a conservative formulation, Katie Eyer has persuasively documented how racial progressives advocated for an intent rule through
much of the twentieth century as a way to defeat Southern states' efforts to
circumvent desegregation rulings. Katie R. Eyer, Ideological Drift and the Forgotten History of Intent, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REv. 1, 4-5 (2016).
210 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
720 (2007); see also Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (describing the
use of such classifications as "pernicious" (internal quotation marks omitted));
Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMvI L. REv. 9, 10 (2003) ("[Tihe anticlassification . . . . principle holds that the government may not classify people either

overtly or surreptitiously on the basis of a forbidden category: for example, their
race.").
211 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) ("Federal
racial classifications, like those of a State, must serve a compelling governmental
interest, and must be narrowly tailored to further that interest.").
212

Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2210 (2016).
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several different ways. 2 13 Consider, for example, a recent racial
gerrymandering decision in which the Supreme Court affirmed
that "a state law . . . enacted with discriminatory intent"
presented a constitutional problem. 2 14 The Court's reference
to "discriminatory intent" might mean several different things.
Does it require a showing that legislators responsible for redistricting despised or feared African Americans? What if they
simply embraced negative racial stereotypes and hence viewed
minorities as less worthy of political influence? Or what if they
simply viewed Blacks as "not our people" in a partisan sense?
The Court does not say which of these count as "discriminatory
intent." Indeed, it is a remarkable feature of Equal Protection
jurisprudence that its central term-intent-remains clouded
in uncertainty after almost fifty years of service.
Putting this uncertainty to one side, it seems clear that in
the modal Equal Protection case, the terms "intent" and "purpose" are typically used to describe the interior psychological
disposition or beliefs of a particular individual. 2 15 To be sure,
there are cases in which courts have drawn inferences about
the intentions of collective bodies such as legislatures, 2 16 including racial gerrymandering challenges. But these cases are
generally recognized as presenting difficult problems of aggregation and inference because collective bodies do not themselves have intents-only their members do. 2 1 7 Even
challenges to collective bodies' decisions do not deviate from
the baseline psychological model of "intent" as individual belief
or disposition insofar as they presuppose the possibility of ag-

gregating individual intents.
2.

Applying Equal ProtectionDoctrine to Machine
Learning

Difficulties arise in transposing equality doctrine to the
machine-learning context. In part, these difficulties track ambiguities in extant applications of that law; in part, they are
distinct to this new technology. I consider here how application
213
See generally Aziz Z. Huq, What Is DiscriminatoryIntent?, 103 CORNELL L.
REV. 1211, 1240-63 (2018) (exploring the divergent potential meanings of intent
in the constitutional context of antidiscrimination law).
214 Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018).

215 See, e.g., Foster v. Chatman, 136 S. Ct. 1737, 1754 (2016) (invalidating a
criminal conviction on Sixth Amendment grounds due to improper preemptory
strikes and citing to the prosecutor's "racial animosity" (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
216 For a rare example, see Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985).
217
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutionally ForbiddenLegislative Intent, 130
HARv. L. REv. 523, 536-37 (2016).

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

1920

[Vol. 105:1875

of anticlassification norms and intent-related rules generate
difficulties. In this section, I argue that the principal ways in
which machine-learning tools raise equality-related concerns
are not well captured by anticlassification and intent-focused
rules.
Consider first the application of anticlassification rules to
the use of race labels in training data. At first blush, the doctrine might be read to suggest that any state use of individuals'
race as "an input to [the] system" triggers constitutional concern. 2 18 The use of race as a "feature" might be seen as analogous to its use as a factor in college applications. In the latter
context, the inovocation of race as one factor among many still
generates strict judicial scrutiny.2 1 9
But this line of reasoning may move too fast. For the use of
race as a label in machine learning is arguably distinct from its
use in college admissions. The latter is public and "divisive"2 20
in the way that the technical, often practically indiscernible,
use of race in machine-learning systems is not. Moreover,
there is a gap between race awareness and impermissible racial
classification. Human decision makers employed by the state
(such as a police officer or a case worker) are often inevitably
aware of race. They are, very simply, immediately presented
with phenotypical evidence in the majority of cases. It follows
that an official's mere awareness of race raises no constitutional problem. By analogy, it may also be that mere inclusion
of race as a feature of training data should not be per se problematic. Rather, such inclusion should be construed to be
analogous to the visual accounting for race in quotidian
human interactions. 2 2 1 Race as a feature is constitutionally
problematic only if it influences ultimate decisions in a constitutionally relevant way.
But what counts as a "constitutionally relevant way"? In
the intent context, the Court has applied a but-for causation
rule. 2 2 2 Logically, this should also apply to anticlassification
challenges. Applying the but-for causation rule to the ma218
219

Barocas & Selbst, supra note 182, at 695.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208 (2016).

220

Id. at 2210.

221 For a similar observation in respect to the reliance element of a securities
fraud action, see Yavar Bathaee, The Artificial Intelligence Black Box and the
Failureof Intent and Causation, 31 HARv. J. L. & TECH. 889, 925-26 (2018).
222 E.g., Pers. Adm'r. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (proof of
discriminatory purpose requires showing that government decision maker "selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon an identifiable group").
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chine-learning context requires courts to determine whether
race's inclusion as a feature was a but-for cause of a specific
decision. That is, application of a colorblindness rule would
lead to a potentially complex technical inquiry into the
counterfactual relevance of the race or gender feature.
A race-aware classifier that met this causation requirement, nevertheless, would likely implicate the anticlassification
doctrine's concern with "protecting individuals from the harm
of categorization by race."2 2 3 As such, it would trigger strict
scrutiny. Then, one could ask, how would this standard work,
and in particular what would it entail for a racially aware classifier to be narrowly tailored? Because of a statistical phenomenon called "subgroup validity," it is often the case that a failure
to include a feature with real-world effects leads to substantial
accuracy losses. 2 2 4 Excluding race from a learner might have
accuracy costs. At some point, the scale of that accuracy loss
might be so great that a racial classifier would be (on some
view) necessary. It is quite unclear, however, what kind of
accuracy loss would be required in order to demonstrate that
race's use in a classifier was "narrowly tailored" in a constitutionally adequate way. 2 25 The Court has never defined clearly
what "narrowly tailored" means, nor provided any kind of numerical guidance for its application. 2 26 This ambiguity already
leads to uncertainty in non-algorithmic contexts, where the
Court has resolved by failing to provide a precise definition and
eliding the definitional question. The leading precedent on
point concerns the use of race to propagate diversity in admissions. It rather evasively indicates that narrow tailoring is
"simply not susceptible to precise metrics."2 2 7 This solution,
though, is not available in the machine-learning context, where
an algorithm's designer must assign a numerical value to the
accuracy or welfare loss due to making her classifier race- or
gender-blind.
223 Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1287 (2011).
224 See Sam Corbett-Davies & Sharad Goel, The Measure and Mismeasure of
Fairness: A Critical Review of Fair Machine-Learning 10 (Aug. 14, 2018), (unpublished manuscript) (providing examples).
225 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
226 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1271
(2007) ("[Tihe Supreme Court has never given analytical clarity to the strict scrutiny formula's central concepts of compelling governmental interests and narrow
tailoring.").
227 David A. Strauss, Fisher v. University of Texas and the Conservative Case
for Affirmative Action, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 16.
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Compounding the difficulty in applying the doctrine further, it may well be that the very exercise of using numerical
accuracy or welfare-related value as a measure of compliance
with the anticlassification norm will strike judges as so inimical
to the ethos of constitutional law-so close to a quota-that
they would balk at the whole enterprise. In this way, the application of anticlassification rules to machine learning would
generate quite novel difficulty.
Application of an intent standard to machine-learning tools
can also raise complications. 2 28 To be sure, it is possible that
the designer of a machine-learning tool acts with discriminatory purpose as that term is used in Equal Protection law. But
I am unaware of any instance in which animus on the part of
an instrument's designers has been credibly alleged.
Discrimination challenges by racial or ethnic minorities
based on intent rather than classification, moreover, are notoriously difficult to prove or win. 2 2 9 This is so when the official
in question openly and repeatedly endorses an illicit motive. 2 30
Assuming there is no "smoking gun" obtained through discovery or depositions, the task of proving unconstitutional intent
will be especially daunting. In particular, when the choice of a
certain technical form or a particular set of training data is the
basis of the challenge, plaintiffs (especially members of a racial
minority) will face an uphill battle. 2 31 Absent the use of an
impermissible classification, plaintiffs alleging intent might argue that a feature was selected because it was "insufficiently
rich . . . to assess members of a protected class." 2 3 2 Alternatively, they might seek to prove that certain features alone or in
juxtaposition have been deliberated selected "as proxies for
228 Huq, supra note 10, at 1088-94.
229 See Russell K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 154
(2016) (contending that "the Supreme Court has steadily diminished the vigor of
the Equal Protection Clause in most respects"); Reva B. Siegel, Foreword:Equality
Divided, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2013). Indeed, given how easy it is to discriminate against racial minorities under existing law, there is little or no litigationrelated incentive to resort to complex algorithms to cover up impermissible hostility to racial minorities. In contrast, members of racial majorities do not need to
demonstrate an illegitimate purpose in affirmative action cases, making the
claims more likely to succeed. See Siegel, supra.
230 See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2421-23 (2018) (upholding
President Trump's travel ban, despite discriminatory rhetoric, because the ban
served legitimate national security purposes); see also Aziz Z. Huq, Article H and
AntidiscriminationNorms, 118 MICH. L. REv. 47, 68-76 (2019) (offering a comprehensive account and critique of that decision).
231 Cf. Bathaee, supra note 221, at 923-25 (suggesting difficulties in attributing specific outcomes from an algorithm to its designer).
232 Kroll et al., supra 140, at 681.

2020)

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

1923

class membership." 2 3 3 But I suspect that these arguments will
rarely be persuasive in the effort to demonstrate intent.
Further, in many contexts in which the state deploys machine learning, including public benefits and criminal justice
domains, race and gender are likely to correlate tightly with
other likely features used in training data (such as zip code or
socioeconomic outcomes). 2 3 4 When there are ready proxies for
race or gender effects, a discriminatory state entity can ensure
that disfavored groups receive more negative outcomes by including those features in the training data. 2 35 In criminal justice applications, for example, there are likely to be "plenty of
opportunities to associate certain social categories with statistical regularities, stereotypes, and past discrimination." 236 As
a result of such collinearity, even a classifier that does not
leverage race as a training-data feature is likely to "learn negative associations for certain social labels," including race. 2 3 7
That is, discriminatory and nondiscriminatory classifiers may
look similar. With the exercise of moderate foresight, therefore,
an intentional discriminator can easily skirt liability. Again,
this problem is not distinct to the machine-learning context.
But the sheer diversity of available features may make it more
acute.
In short, the application of anticlassification and intent
doctrines (absent a "smoking gun") are likely to generate difficult questions of proof, battles between experts about the purpose of various technical decisions, and few easy resolutions.
3.

Equality and Machine Learning Reconsidered

Many of the equality-related concerns raised about machine learning, however, do not sound in the register of anticlassification or intent. They instead suggest the need for an
alternative normative approach.
A common concern with machine-learning classifiers is
their capacity to encode human biases, blind spots, or other233

Id.
See Barocas & Selbst, Big Data'sDisparateImpact, supranote 182, at 692.
235 A recent paper argues that "proving discrimination will be easier" if algorithms replace human decision makers. Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil
Mullainathan, & Cass R. Sunstein, Discriminationin the Age of Algorithms, 10 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 113, 114 (2019). Where an algorithm designer shapes a model or
selects features out of a discriminatory motive, though, this conclusion does not
follow.
236 Betsy Anne Williams, Catherine F. Brooks, & Yotam Shmargad, How Algorithms Discriminate Based on Data They Lack: Challenges, Solutions, and Policy
Implications, 8 J. INFO. PoL'Y 78, 89 (2018).
234

237
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wise normatively troubling assumptions or regularities derived
from training data, outcome variables, or other design margins. 23 8 For example, in 2013, it was shown that a search on
Google for typically Black names produced advertisements for
arrest records in nearly 90% of cases, while a search for typically white names produced the same sorts of advertisements
in less than 25% of cases. 2 3 9 In 2019, a different study of a
widely used commercial instrument used to recommend care
regimes for high-risk patients was flagging equally at-risk
Blacks and whites at divergent rates. 2 4 0 Black patients, as a
result, received fewer interventions despite high morbidity risk.
The divergence arose, the study found, because of the instrument's reliance on health care costs as an outcome variable.
Recall also some facial recognition tools have errors rates for
black women 34.7% higher than those for white men. 2 4 1 None
of these equality-related concerns are well understood as a
worry about either the use of a particular classification or a
designer's intent. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the large technical
literature on algorithmic bias also eschews a focus on those
concepts. 2 4 2
It is possible to generalize from these examples to identify
equality-related errors that predictably arise in the machinelearning context but that cannot be easily fit within existing
intent-based or anticlassification doctrine. Three examples
worth emphasizing are sample bias, feature bias, and label
bias. 2 4

3

Sample bias results from nonrandom sampling to create
training data. For example, training data for the Allegheny
County AFST score arguably reflected bias on the part of mem238 There are several competing and inconsistent accounts of nondiscrimination in the literature. See Huq, supra note 10, at 1115-23 (collecting models of
fairness).
239 Latanya Sweeney, Discriminationin Online Ad Delivery, ACM QUEUE, Mar.
2013, at 1, 12; see also SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: How
SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM 66-80 (2018) (providing examples or race-spe-

cific searches that generated derogatory results for Black- but not white-associated terms).
240 Ziad Obermeyer, Brian Powers, Christine Vogeli, & Sendhil Mullainathan,
Dissecting Racial Bias in an Algorithm Used to Manage the Health of Populations,
366 SCIENCE 447, 447 (2019).

241 Buolamwini & Gebru, supranote 140, at 11.
242 For a useful recent summary, see Deirdre K. Mulligan, Joshua A. Kroll,
Nitin Kohli, & Richmond Y. Wong, This Thing Called Fairness:DisciplinaryConfusion Realizing a Value in Technology, 3 PROC. ACM ON HUM.-COMPUTER INTERACTION
119:1, 119:24-26 (2019).

243 These terms are adopted, with some changes, from Corbett-Davies & Goel,
supranote 224, at 17-19.
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bers of the public reporting a risk, with Black families coming
under state supervision for more minor infractions than white
families. 2 44 As a result, there were more Black families identified as problematic than white families, leading to distortion in
the sample. Feature bias occurs if a particular feature assigned to the training data is systematically erroneous because
features are mislabeled at different rates across different
groups. 2 4 5 This might occur in a labor market analysis, for
instance, if women are erroneously labeled as less productive
as a consequence of biased appraisals.
Finally, label bias arises if the designated outcome variable
fails to track ground truth equally well for different groups. 2 46
An outcome variable may evince bias in respect to a specific
subgroup where the label is assigned to different social groups
at different thresholds. Consider a bail algorithm that is
trained using data for which arrest rates are available. If police
are more willing to arrest some racial groups rather than others
based on the same predicate behavior, then using race as an
outcome variable will introduce bias into the data.
None of these problems are well captured by existing Equal
Protection doctrine.2 4 7 At a minimum, this suggests that the
normative concerns animating the latter are not necessarily
identical to the equality-related concerns raised by machine
classification. In my view, it is better to recognize that invidious intent and anticlassification do not provide a comprehensive or perspicuous lens to analyze the equality concerns raised
by machine-learning tools. While the fashioning of a fully developed alternative to existing equality law is a task that falls
beyond my project here, I offer here a very preliminary sketch of
244
245

EUBANKS, supra note 75, at 153.

See Vida Williams, Combatting Data Bias: Goal, Data, Feature and Model
Bias, MEDIUM (July 23, 2019), https://medium.com/@SingleStoneCX/combatting-data-bias-goal-data-feature-and-model-bias-5aeafl9b83fe
[https://
perma.cc/PDC6-KAYH].
246 See Corbett-Davies & Goel, supra note 224, at 17-20.
247 One reason for this is a mismatch with the standard conceptions of discrimination may be a bad fit for the machine learning context. Leading philosophical accounts of discrimination hinge on the notion that certain actions are
discriminatory insofar as they manifest disrespect toward a person because they
fail to "recognize certain features of... persons qua persons, such as the intrinsic
value of their well-being or the character of their individual autonomy." BENJAMIN
EIDELSON, DISCRIMINATION AND DISRESPECT 6 (2015); see also DEBORAH HELLMAN,
WHEN IS DISCRIMINATION WRONG? 7-8 (2008) (focusing on how "demeaning" action
impinges on the "equal worth" of persons). These accounts take as a modal case
an interpersonal encounter between individuals in which respect or disdain can
be simultaneously manifested and experienced. This is not characteristic of the
machine-learning state.
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what a reconceptualized approach to equality concerns, at
some distance from the current constitutional regime, might
look like.
To begin with, it is worth underscoring that the precise
nature of "race" remains contested, even among natural and
social scientists. 2 4 8 Without resolving that disagreement here,
it is still possible to observe that race is normatively relevant
because it is deployed as a "social fact" by individuals and
institutions responsible for critical distributive decisions. 24 9
As a result of this social usage, race (like gender and disability)
has come to be closely correlated with other indicia of disadvantage and exclusion. Thanks to this redundant encoding of
race with other measures of exclusion, overt reliance on race or
correlated traits (e.g., educational outcomes, residential zip
code) often have the effect of strengthening the tendency of
resources and opportunities to be distributed in predictably
asymmetrical ways. It is the ensuing lopsided diminishment in
life chances and material goods for historically marginalized
groups that comprises the harm against which equality norms
should insulate. A plausible alternative reconceptualization of
equality norms for machine-learning instruments therefore focuses on the risk that prediction-driven allocations of benefits
or harms amplify the stratifying social effect of race (or, for that
matter, kindred classifications such as gender, sexual identity,
disability, and ethnicity).
An accounting for such harms in the machine-learning
context cannot be done by a mechanical rule against raceconsciousness, or by a categorical presumption against prediction. Indeed, it seems to me unlikely, given present levels of
racial stratification, that predictive instruments will be able to
avoid such harms without some conscientious consideration of
the specific mechanisms whereby disadvantage is transmitted
over time and space, and (at times) race conscious interventions to disrupt these mechanisms' operation. Where such interventions have social costs (say, by increasing error rates
across whole populations), an algorithmic designer must make
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For a documenting of such disagreements, see ANN MORNING, THE NATURE OF

RACE: How SCIENTISTS THINK AND TEACH ABOUT HUMAN DIFFERENCE 3-8 (2011). For

an illuminating debate among philosophers, see generally JOSHUA GLASGOW, SALLY
HASLANGER, CHIKE JEFFERS, & QUAYSHAWN SPENCER, WHAT IS RACE?: FOUR PHILOSOPHI-

CAL VIEWS (2019).
249
See Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Reply, The Essential Social Fact of Race, 64 AM.

Soc. REv. 899, 899 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); Mara Loveman,
Comment, Is "Race"Essential?, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 891, 891 (1999).
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decisions about how to trade-off between equity and other

goals.
Of course, such trade-offs are politically and normatively
controversial. The rise of machine prediction, though, places
them in sharp relief. Advances in computational prediction, in
other words, are likely to sharpen the conflict between colorblindness and the goal of a social order in which race (or kindred properties) does not define an individual's life course and
opportunity set.
C.

Privacy

Privacy is a plural not a monolithic concept. It is "complex . .. entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions,
[and] engorged with various and distinct meanings." 25 0 I focus
here on one strand: privacy in respect to information, in the
sense of an instrumental ability to determine how, and to
whom, information held closely by a person is disclosed. 25 1 In
the United States, 25 2 jurisprudence on informational privacy is
far less developed than due process or equality case law. I
describe briefly the doctrinal landscape. I then explore the
ways in which machine learning can impose distinct harms to
informational privacy and ask how a more expansive constitutional or subconstitutional privacy regime might be articulated
in response.
1.

ConstitutionalPrivacy Norms

The Supreme Court has never recognized a free-standing
right to informational privacy. In the 1977 case of Whalen v.
Roe, it assumed arguendo a constitutional entitlement against
250 Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001).
For a useful taxonomy of the various margins of contestation over privacy, see
Deirdre K. Mulligan, Colin Koopman, & Nick Doty, Privacy Is an Essentially Contested Concept:A Multi-DimensionalAnalyticfor MappingPrivacy, 374 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SoC'Y A 1, 11 (2016) (distinguishing contests over privacy's
foundation, the scope of its protections, the nature of harms involved, and its
scope in time and space).
251 Helen Nissenbaum has usefully introduced a distinction between norms of
"appropriateness" and "distribution" or "flow" that illuminate "whether [information's] distribution, or flow, respects contextual norms of information flow" in a
given social sphere. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY,
AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 236 (20010).

252 This is slightly different from the idea of "data privacy" in European law,
which is "compromised whenever a data controller processes personal information in a manner that is irrelevant or no longer relevant for the specified purposes
for which the information has been acquired." Robert C. Post, Data Privacy and
DignitaryPrivacy: Google Spain, the Right to Be Forgotten, and the Constructionof
the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981, 998 (2018).
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the state's improper collection, aggregation, or disclosure of an
individual's private information. 25 3 Although the Supreme
Court has never extended Whalen to recognize a full-fledged
constitutional right to informational privacy, some circuit
courts have built on its foundation. A few have suggested that
no such right obtains, while others have crafted a cautious
doctrinal test for the right. 25 4 A 2010 precedent appears to
read Whalen narrowly but conspicuously declined to reject the
25 5
possibility of a constitutional right to informational privacy.
Carpenter v. United States, which narrowed the third-party
doctrine in the Fourth Amendment context, also recognized a
right against government acquisition of private information
held by third parties. 25 6 But third-party doctrine under the
Fourth Amendment is analytically distinct from the idea of a
free-standing right to control private inferences from data that
would otherwise not have been illuminating.
Given the weakness of the constitutional law of information
privacy, it is worth looking beyond it to federal and state statutes or regulations. Subconstitutional law, however, is a
patchwork. Some federal statutory and regulatory privacy protections generally extend to private actors, but not to federal or
state actors. 25 7 At the subnational level, states such as California, New York, and Massachusetts have imposed data security
25 8 Furobligations on large companies, but not state actors.
253 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977) (describing an "interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters"); see also Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433
U.S. 425, 457 (1977) (citing the quoted language in Whalen).

254 For a discussion of the conflicting lower court precedent on this point, see
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reunifying Privacy Law, 98 CALIF. L. REv. 2007, 2016-17
(2010).
255 See Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin. v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 147-48
(2011) ("As was our approach in Whalen, we will assume for present purposes that
the Government's challenged inquiries implicate a privacy interest of constitutional significance.").
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219-20 (2018) (rejecting application of the third-party
256
doctrine to cell-site locational data). For a useful analysis see generally Alan Z.
Rozenshtein, Fourth Amendment Reasonableness After Carpenter, 128 YALE L.J.
FORUM 943, 947-54 (2019).
257 For instance, acting under the Health Insurance Portability and Accounta-

bility Act of 1996, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services has created
by regulation a duty to "[p]rotect against any reasonably anticipated threats or
hazards to the security or integrity" of information covered by the statute. 45
C.F.R. § 164.306(a)(2) (2020). Since 1995, the Federal Trade Commission has
used its statutory authority to police "deceptive" or "unfair" trade practices to

enforce the terms of companies' privacy policies. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow
Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 CoLuM. L. REV. 583,
598-99 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
258 William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN. L. REv. 1135,
1153-84 (2019).
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ther, "a sizeable majority of states have been engaged in privacy
enforcement," albeit largely against private actors. 25 9
State law, and state officials, may thus fill some of the gaps
left by federal law. But it would be wrong to assume that its
coverage is comprehensive and systemic, rather than patchy
and haphazard. As Lior Strahilevitz has explained in a careful
synoptic analysis, this heterogenous approach at both the state
and the federal levels means that there may be instances in
which a state or federal employee can bring a common-law tort
claim of invasion of privacy against an unauthorized governmental disclosure-but whether the employee can will depend
on a complex interaction of federal tort liability, immunity doctrines, and state law. 26 0 Only careful analysis of a particular
jurisdiction's applicable federal and state law will reveal
whether an action counts as a wrong under either federal or
state privacy law.
2.

Privacy Risks from Machine Learning

The operation of machine learning creates two distinct and
new information privacy-related risks. The first involves the
power of the state to draw inferences from data that would
otherwise not reveal a given private fact. This means "private"
information can be acquired without the usual predicate of a
constitutionally regulated "search or seizure." Machine learning can implicate different privacy-ousting inferences. One
possibility involves "category-jumping" inferences to "reveal attributes or conditions an individual has specifically withheld
from others." 2 6 ' Examples include the inference of health conditions from spending-related information, or the inference of
behaviors or dispositions from health-related data. A second
possibility concerns the leveraging of data on one person to
draw inferences about an individual who is not present in the
dataset. Consider, for example, the genetic databases maintained by both the federal government and all fifty states. 26 2
Those databases may be searched not only to match those
samples, but also to match against "close genetic relatives." 26 3
Hence, they permit "out of sample" inferences concerning the
behavior and location of people who have not come into contact
259

Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymakingof State Attorneys General,

92 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 747, 758 (2016).
260 Strahilevitz, supra note 254, at 2017-18.
261 Horvitz & Mulligan, supra note141, at 253.
262 Natalie Ram, DNA by the Entirety, 115 CoLuM. L. REv. 873, 881 (2015).
263 Id. at 882-83.
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with the criminal justice system. Similarly, consumer genetic
platforms, such as GEDmatch and FamilyTreeDNA, contain
larger pools of genetic data. 2 64 Some voluntarily allow law enforcement access. It is likely that the inferential potential of
genetic data will increase in the near term. In 2018, researchers used a measure of allele differentiation across the whole
genome, called a polygenic risk score, to make impressive population-level predictions of educational and cognitive
performance. 26 5
A second and distinct form of potential privacy-related
harm emerges from a different source. Machine learning depends on the exploitation of large pools of training data. Often
held by the state, such pools create a risk of data breaches that
impose substantial privacy and pecuniary costs upon individual subjects. In states such as Pennsylvania, officials have
even created new data warehouses that collect and house information flows from several, otherwise disparate, state agencies
to leverage for predictive ends. 26 6 Data breaches can result
from either negligent or malicious action and come from inside
or outside an entity. Studies find a substantial risk of large
breaches with the risk rising for any given entity as the amount
7
of data it holds grows. 26
Breaches of databases can yield not merely unanticipated
and socially inappropriate disclosures. As a result of a breach,
it is argued, individuals can also suffer "an increased risk of
identity theft, fraud, and reputational damage," and immediate
"[elmotional distress." 26 8 It is only because "reliable information regarding the cause, severity and volume of privacy violations is lacking" that there remains uncertainty about both the
26 9 It
scale of the problem and the adequacy of legal responses.
264 Natalie Ram, The U.S. May Soon Have a De Facto NationalDNA Database,
SLATE (Mar. 19, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://slate.com/technology/2019/03/nation
al-dna-database-law-enforcement-genetic-genealogy.html [https://perma.cc/
7L79-3XCG].
265 James J. Lee et al., Gene Discovery and Polygenic Predictionfrom a Gen-

ome-Wide Association Study of EducationalAttainment in 1.1 Million Individuals,
50 NATURE GENETICS 1112, 1116 (2018) (using polygenic risk scores to explain
11-13% of the variance in educational attainment and 7-10% of the variance in
cognitive performance).
266 EUBANKS, supra note 75, at 135.
267 Benjamin Edwards, Steven Hofineyr, & Stephanie Forrest, Hype and
Heavy Tails: A Closer Look at Data Breaches, 2 J. CYBERSECURrIY 3, 4-6 (2016)
(reporting findings of an empirical survey of data breaches in the private sector).
268 Daniel J. Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk and Anxiety: A Theory of
Data-BreachHarms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737, 745 (2018).
269 Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro Acquisti, Privacy Costs and PersonalData
Protection: Economic and Legal Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061, 1101
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seems likely that the diffusion of machine learning across state
functions increases the risk of such privacy-related losses
above and beyond the risks created by private efforts to collect
and analyze individuals' data.
3.

Privacy Rights in the Machine-Learning State

The range and variation in information privacy harms that
can emerge from machine learning obviates the possibility of a
single "right to privacy" in that context. Rather than a single
right, privacy is better conceptualized as a congeries of entitlements linked by a joint concern with maintaining an appropriate flow of data. Privacy in this context, however, cannot be
reduced to a measure of individuated control; 2 7 0 the latter is
merely one component of a larger repertoire of appropriate responses. I explore three pathways-prohibitions, retail control
rights, and privacy "by design"-concluding that the latter is
likely most promising despite its shortfalls and limitations.
A first option for responding to machine learning's privacy
risks is exemplified by San Francisco's prophylactic bar on
facial recognition tools. This is a simple prohibition on the
gathering and use of certain kinds of data. 2 7 1 I am skeptical,
however, that constraints on information acquisition are tenable in the facial-recognition context. The privacy concerns
raised by such tools, not least, are unlikely to be addressed
successfully by banning public surveillance alone when private
surveillance persists. The video surveillance industry throughout the Americas was valued at $3.9 billion in 2016.272 By the
same year, roughly 60% of all cameras sold were network
ready. Forty percent of those featured embedded video analytics "as a means to automate the monitoring process and [they]
can be particularly effective in proactively identifying events as
they happen or extracting information from recorded video." 2 7 3
(2009). For a study of the resulting litigation (which is perforce an unreliable
guide to the actual incidence of data breaches), see Sasha Romanosky, David
Hoffman & Alessandro Acquisti, EmpiricalAnalysis of DataBreachLitigation 11 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 74, 74-75, 93 (2014) (identifying and analyzing more than
230 data breach suits in federal court between 2000 and 2010).
270 Cf. Cynthia Dwork & Deirdre K. Mulligan, It's Not Privacy, and It's Not Fair,
66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 35, 36 (2013) ("[P]rivacy controls and increased transparency fail to address concerns with the classifications and segmentation produced by big data analysis.").
271 See Conger, supra note 153.
272
IHS MARKIT, VIDEO SURVEILLANCE: How TECHNOLOGY AND THE CLOUD Is DIsRUPTING THE MARKET 5 (2019), https://cdn.ihs.com/www/pdf/IHS-Markit-Tech

nology-Video-surveilance.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FC7-3PK4].
273

Id. at 4, 6.
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Even if the state eschews such tools, as in San Francisco,
private actors will build databases and pursue recognitionbased inferences aggressively. Once private use of these tools
is sufficiently pervasive, I am dubious that it will be feasible to
maintain a prohibition on state usage of a technology in the
face of pervasive private usage. To the public, the latter are
likely to seem perverse and otiose-especially in the wake of
high-profile crimes or violent crises.
Categorical prohibitions on collection or inference may be
more effective, however, in other domains. Since 2008, the
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) has prohibited insurers and employers from relying on genetic data in
making coverage or hiring decisions. 2 7 4 Because "the paradigmatic GINA claim" arises when an insurer "either drops coverage or hikes up premiums based on a genetic test that reveals a
previously unknown health risk," the statute is best understood as a prophylaxis against inferential exploitation of data
that, standing on its own, is unilluminating. 2 75 Bans on certain kinds of machine-learning inference might be justified on
privacy grounds, or on the ground that certain kinds of predictions are not properly within the state's authority. GINA, for
example, might be justified by the view that biology should not
2 76
be treated by the state as destiny.
On the other hand, it is hard to see a similar prohibition
being extended to state action, since there is some evidence
that the creation of DNA databases is associated with meaning277
ful declines in serious crimes, such as murder and rape.
Where there are competing social goods that might offset privacy losses, a ban might be implemented with sunset clauses.
Temporary measures of this kind would allow regulators to
learn how a technology is applied, whether it has greater benefits than costs, and how those costs can be mitigated.
Another alternative is a more narrowly tailored retail right
to challenge specific inferences. Use regulation of this sort is
2 78 and has
already available in the foreign intelligence context,
274

42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg-53(a)-(c), 2000ff-1(a) (2018).

275

Bradley A. Areheart & Jessica L. Roberts, GINA, Big Data, and the Futureof

Employee Privacy, 128 YALE L.J. 710, 723-24 (2019).

276 Cf. id. at 723 (noting concerns about adverse selection in health insurance
markets with genetic testing).
277 Jennifer L. Doleac, The Effects of DNA Databaseson Crime, 9 AM. ECON. J.
165, 166-67, 182-85 (2017).

278 Queries of the bulk metadata collected under Section 215 of the Patriot Act
must be supported by "reasonable, articulable suspicion." In re Application of the
FBIfor an OrderRequiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR
13-80, at 7 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013).
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been urged by scholars more broadly as a means to regulate
government databases. 2 79
Yet there is a case for caution before embracing a regulatory reform predicated on dispersed lawsuits by uncoordinated
individuals, each challenging a particular use of a machinelearning tool. For one thing, a remedial framework hinging on
individualized permissions for machine inferences does not account for the possibility that an official will be able to aggregate
insights across several different searches in ways that create
new privacy violations. Hence, searching video data for a specific person's movements might constitute a serious privacy
invasion only if the officer also has access to that person's
internet metadata. A granular system of warrants may thus
miss important aggregation-enabled effects. 28 0

More generally, in the criminal justice domain, ex ante
screens have not proven to be consistently effectual checks on
official discretion. 28 I The sheer breadth of the modern criminal
law lowers the cost of obtaining warrants in the criminal justice
context. Similarly, the regulation of machine-learning inferences would be subject to substantive inflation of the justificatory grounds upon which government action is allowed. Given
the imperfect performance of the Fourth Amendment's warrant
rule in the face of substantive criminal law's inflation, 28 2 there
is no reason for optimism about a parallel ex ante screening
rule in the less salient context of machine learning. Instead,
the weakness of the present individualized ex ante screening
system for criminal searches may be a reason for a more systemic approach in the machine learning context.
A further problem with retail articulation of privacy rights
is that individuals seem to be highly imperfect users of protec279 Emily Berman, When DatabaseQueries Are FourthAmendment Searches,
102 MINN. L. REv. 577, 579-80 (2017) ("[Wjhen a database query returns information that the government could otherwise collect only through a Fourth Amend-

ment-regulated means, the Fourth Amendment should regulate that query.").
280 On the other hand, warrants do now impose forward-looking minimization
requirements. And in an academic context, institutional review boards can and
do place constraints on the combination of empirical data. Enforcing a rule
against combinatory actions, however, would require a good deal of tweaking of
the present warrant system.
281 Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking WarrantsSeriously, 106 Nw. U. L.
REv. 1609, 1610-11 (2012) ("Wihat was once a 'warrant requirement' is now a

rule so laden with exceptions that it best resembles a piece of Swiss cheese .... ").
282 Of course, there are conceivable reforms to make warrants more effective.
See, e.g., id. at 1610-15 (advocating for a clear, revitalized warrant requirement

that requires a warrant whenever it is feasible to obtain one). But if those reforms
have not taken hold in the ordinary criminal justice domain, should we expect
them to take hold in the machine learning domain?
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tive tools. One of the distinctive characteristics of privacy
harms is the fact that they can arise long after a specific disclosure is made. Retail instantiation of a privacy right assumes
that individuals will be able to anticipate and account for temporally distinct harms. It is not clear this is so. Several studies
have identified divergent valuations of privacy rights in contractual settings, with variance seemingly motivated by the endowment effects 28 3 or by an irrational willingness to trade
privacy to create a "possibly permanent negative annuity in the
future." 2 84 Cognitive failures of this kind emerge even though
the data acquired by platforms and vendors through online
transactions has considerable economic value; one estimate
suggests that American internet platforms derived $63.8 billion
in value from consumers' personal information in 2017 and
$76 billion in 2018.285
A third possibility beyond bans and retail control rights
focuses on building privacy concerns directly into the architecture of a machine learning instrument. There is a range of
28 6
loosely defined "best practices" for "privacy by design."
These require privacy to be "embedded into the design and
7 Government can
architecture" of informational systems. 2
implement privacy by design solutions directly or can delegate
283

Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie K. John, & George Loewenstein, What Is Pri-

vacy Worth?, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 249-52 (2013).
284 Alessandro Acquisti & Jens Grossklags, Privacy and Rationality in Individ-

ual DecisionMaking, 3 ECON. INFO. SECURITY 26, 31 (2005). For similar results, see
Kirsten Martin, Privacy Notices as Tabula Rasa: An Empirical Investigation into
How Complying with a Privacy Notice Is Related to Meeting Privacy Expectations
Online, 34 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 210, 219-21 (2015).
285 ROBERT SHAPIRO & SIDDHARTHA ANEJA, FUTURE MAJORITY, WHO OWNS AMERICANS' PERSONAL INFORMATION AND WHAT IS IT WORTH? 3 (2019), https://

www. futuremaj ority. org/pages/who-owns-americans-personal-information
[https://perma.cc/EHA5-B7BX]; see also Matthew Crain, The Limits of Transparency: DataBrokers and Connodffcation, 20 NEw MEDIA & SOC'Y 88, 90 (2018)
(describing data brokerage as a $200 billion industry). Empirical studies suggest
that "[wihen consumers learn that their data is a tradable asset, they value their
data significantly more." Sarah Spiekermann & Jana Korunovska, Towards a
Value Theory for Personal Data, 32 J. INFO. TECH. 62, 74 (2017).
286 Seda Gurses, Carmela Troncoso, & Claudia Diaz, Engineering Privacy by
Design Reloaded, 14 CONF. ON COMPUTERS, PRIVACY & DATA PROTECTION, 2011, at 1,
3-4. For the seminal work on this topic, see ANN CAVOUKIAN, PRIVACY BY DESIGN:
THE 7 FOUNDATIONAL PRINCIPLES (2009), http://www.privacybydesign.ca/content/

uploads/2009/08/7foundationalprinciples.pdf [https://perma.cc/5U2X-B3WHi.
The Federal Trade Commission has endorsed privacy-by-design principles. FTC,
PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR

& POLICYMAKERS 111 (2012), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/
120326privacyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/TK9B-X9BL.
287 Cavoukian, supra note 286, § 3.
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288
the tasks to private-sector actors who handle sensitive data.
Privacy by design operates, as its name suggests, at a systemwide level. One analysis of network security, for example, underscores the need for a "flexible and modular" architecture for
holding data. 28 9 Another catalogs a number of "system[s] . . . designed to detect and prevent the unauthorized
2 90
access, use, or transmission of confidential information."
Data can be classified according to its sensitivity, access can be
regulated directly and through encryption, and especially sensitive data can be stored in distributed silos, so no one breach
will generate too much damage. 2 9 1 Where information is dispersed across numerous physical devices, such as surveillance
cameras or the Rapid-DNA "swab in-profile out" box, 2 9 2 security against hacks is hard or impossible to achieve through
patching, and instead must be integrated in the design and
construction stage. 2 9 3 The core point is again that privacy,
whether a matter of a centralized database or a network of
distributed devices, must be hardwired at the design stage. It
cannot be effectively supplied at the back end. It is more akin
to constitutional structures such as the separation of powers
than to a discrete individual right. 2 9 4
To be sure, the strategy of privacy by design is no panacea.
In a recent survey, Deirdre Mulligan and Kenneth Bamberger
stress the difficulty of "intentionally translating values into design requirements" given cognitive biases and unintended con-

288 Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms, Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 385-86
(2006).
289 Simon Liu & Rick Kuhn, DataLoss Prevention, 12
290

IT

PRO. 10, 13 (2010).

ASAF SHABTAI, YUVAL ELOVICI & LIOR ROKACH, A SURVEY OF DATA LEAKAGE

DETECTION AND PREVENTION SOLUTIONS 10 (2012).

291

Faheem Ullah et al., Data Exflltration: A Review of External Attack Vectors

and Countermeasures, 101 J. NETWORK & COMPUTER APPLICATIONS 18, 26-27 (2018);

&

see also Lior Arbel, DataLoss Prevention: The Business Case, 5 COMPUTER FRAUD
SECURITY 13, 14-15 (2015) (emphasizing the creation of systems for constraining
and tracking data access).
292 Rapid DNA analysis is a new technology that allows for DNA testing of
buccal swabs to be done at police stations, rather than at a centralized facility.
Jacklyn Buscaino et al., Evaluationof a Rapid DNA Process with the RapidHT ID
System Using a Specialized Cartridgefor Extracted and Quantified Human DNA,
34 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 116, 116-17 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted).
293
Bruce Schneier, Internet Hacking Is About to Get Much Worse, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/11/opinion/internet-hacking-cybersecurity-iot.html [https://perma.cc/JC8Y-ELKX].
294 Cf. Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605,
1612-15 (2007) (arguing that if policymakers adhere to the view that privacy
rights are coextensive with explicit privacy laws, they may be omitting a significant source of privacy interests).
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sequences. 2 95 This, they argue, is a result of deficiencies in the
governmental processes through which privacy by design is
realized:
[E]xisting institutions and processes of democratic and administrative governance have proven to be defective designwar battlefields. They are structurally unsuited to the deliberative decision making [sic] necessary for governance-bydesign. No domestic venue exists for the broad conversation
about which values to embed in which circumstances. Administrative process frequently fails even to recognize technology design choices as matters of public policy, rather than
private choice or government procurement. Agencies generally lack both the technical expertise and the mandate to
consider fully the implications of embedding values in design. . . . [A]gency-by-agency decisionmaking [sic] creates
downstream ripple effects, prioritizing certain values and
precluding reasoned deliberation over others. First movers,
particularly those that exercise the greatest sway over the
private sector, may co-opt technology to their agencies' particular missions. 2 96

In response to these concerns, they offer a series of best practices to mitigate institutional pathologies. 2 9 7 Their careful
analysis suggests the need for careful institutional design of
agencies and departments tasked with the implementation of
privacy by design.
In sum, information privacy, like due process and equality,
is promoted through the careful design and maintenance of
institution-level systems. It is a property of the overall informational architecture in which machine-learning tools are operated, not of any individual act of classification or prediction.
No doubt the specific instruments that are best tailored to privacy's production in this context will change as technology
shifts and as we move from PC-based applications to phonebased tools to the internet of things (and perhaps thence to
mind-AI integration2 98 ). But it seems probable that the system-level locus of privacy-responsive policymaking will persist.
295 Deirdre K. Mulligan & Kenneth A. Bamberger, Saving Governance-by-Design, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 697, 710 (2018).

296 Id. at 701-02. For criticism of "privacy by design" as ambiguous and an
inappropriate delegation of authority to (unrepresentative) engineers, see Ari Ezra
Waldman, Privacy's Law of Design, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1239, 1273 & n.229
(2019).

297 See generally Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 295, at 742-80.
298 Cf. Alex Knapp, Elon Musk Sees His Neuralink Merging Your Brain with A.L,
FoRBES (July 17, 2019, 7:41 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/alexknapp/
2019/07/17/elon-musk-sees-his-neuralink-merging-your-brain-with-ai/
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Constitutional Norms for Machine Learning: A
Summary

My aim in this Part has been to examine how important
constitutional values of due process, equality, and privacy are
raised by the machine-learning state. Application of those
norms implicates not just familiar challenges encountered in
the non-algorithmic context but also new problems. In respect
to each right, I have suggested a recalibrated account of the
relevant norm. In closing, I want to draw attention to a com-

mon thread tying these analyses together: When humans interact with algorithmic systems, normative concerns tend to arise
because of structural or design decisions that affect many or all
users, and not just because of the specifics of particular interactions. Constitutionalnorms of proceduraldue process, equality or privacy, that is, pervasively operate at the system rather
than the individual level. Although this is true in some nonalgorithmic contexts, the systematicity of constitutional norms
in the machine-learning state creates a strong reason to break
from the "liability in tort" model that otherwise dominates adjudication of constitutional rights.
The justifications for adopting a systematic and wholesale,
rather than a retail and individualistic, perspective to algorithmic constitutionalism sound in terms of diagnosis, causation, and (relevant to the following Part) remedy. First, from
a diagnostic perspective, the identification of individual cases
of erroneous decisions provides limited evidence that a particular algorithmic classification system has deviated from due process norms. Nor does the fact that a classification rule tends to
rank members of a protected class differently from nonmembers alone bespeak an equality-related problem. 2 9 9
Second, the causes of due process, equality, and privacy
violations tend to lie at the level of system design and operation, not the discrete and isolated action of a street-level official. Without taking a systemic perspective that attends to the
suite of human design decisions embedded in the algorithm's
training data, outcome variable, and method, it will often not
be feasible to identify how or why inaccuracies or systemic
biases occur. In a like vein, data-breach risk tends to emerge
from weaknesses in an information system's architecture. Finally, remedies for due process, equality, and privacy concerns
#1b69a8f74b07 [https://perma.cc/C42P-EX44 (detailing Elon Musk's plan to
develop implants to connect human brains with computers).
See Huq, supra note 10, at 1125-32.
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are likely incomplete without a systemic perspective. Human
appeals from algorithmic decisions may provide due process in
the individual case but are likely to increase the overall error
rate.3 0 0 Eliminating race from the feature set for an algorithmic tool can lead error rates to spike. 3 0 1
This system-level location of due process, equality, and
privacy concerns channels attention to human decisions and
elements of algorithmic design remote in time from the immediate contact between a machine and a regulated human subject.
As a result, it invites new questions about how, in practice,
those norms are to be realized given the dominant "liability in
tort" model of constitutional enforcement 3 0 2-questions that
are taken up more fully in the next Part.
III
CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIATION IN THE MACHINE-LEARNING
STATE

A well-calibrated remedial architecture for the machinelearning state has two elements. It first requires ex ante rules
to force disclosures and generate transparency on the one
hand, and to impose accuracy, privacy, and equality-enhancing mandates on the other. Second, it entails the availability of
aggregate, rather than individual, litigation remedies after the
fact. In other work, I have argued against the idea that a right
to a human appeal is an appropriate response to constitutional
flaws in a predictive tool. 3 0 3 Building on the arguments developed in that earlier article, I posit that aggregate remedies that
focus on system-level characteristics of predictive tools provide
a more effective means of identifying and correcting design
choices that elicit constitutional errors.
The analytic framework employed here draws on a familiar
distinction between rules (whose content is established ex
ante) and standards (given substance after the fact). 3 04 This ex
See Huq, supra note 174, at 667-71 (developing this argument).
See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
302 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
303
See Huq, supra note 174, at 685.
304 Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE
L.J. 557, 568-77 (1992); see also STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 572-74 (2004) (discussing the fundamental dimensions of legal intervention). A standard is partially specified ex ante, but the full range of relevant
considerations, and its precise specification are determined only ex post. For
approaches that this parallels, see Margot E. Kaminski, Binary Governance: Lessons from the GDPR's Approach to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV.
1529, 1552-53 (2019); David Freeman Engstrom & Daniel E. Ho, Algorithmic
Accountability in the Administrative State, YALE J. ON REG. 800, 828-36 (2020).
300
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ante/ex post distinction in practice is correlated, somewhat
imperfectly, with the choice between regulation by administrative agency and regulation through the common-law system of
tort liability. 3 0 5 For the sake of simplicity, I assume here that
ex ante regulation is done by administrative agencies, while
courts undertake ex post review.
Both forms of intervention have familiar strengths. Ex
ante regulation trades on the virtues of bureaucratic expertise,
predictability, and consistency. 3 0 6 Ex post intervention enables private choice by forcing the internalization of potential
damage payments and allowing the "parties to calibrate their
anticipatory remedial measures."307 While some scholarship
treats these strategies as alternatives, in practice "ex ante and
ex post policies are very frequently used jointly."3 0 8 Uncertainty among ex post actors, in particular, can be mitigated by
the promulgation of ex ante rules. 3 0 9 In the machine-learning
context, ex ante regulation can provide off-the-rack templates
for disclosure, transparency standards, and design mandates
for privacy and equality norms. All these mitigate ex post uncertainty and facilitate diagnosis after the fact. But ex post
exposition and review to ensure that constitutional design decisions have been taken and that an instrument has not diminished in accuracy because of brittleness remains a necessary
complement.
This convergence is not particularly surprising. It is likely that most policy domains benefit from some mix of ex ante and ex post solutions. The more interesting question is how to calibrate exactly the nature of the instruments used before
and after the fact.
305 Richard A. Posner, Regulation (Agencies) Versus Litigation (Courts): An Analytical Framework, in REGULATiON vERSUS LITIGATION: PERSPECTIVES FROM ECONOMICS
AND LAw 11, 13-19 (Daniel P. Kessler ed., 2010).
306 Susan Rose-Ackerman, Regulation and the Law of Torts, 81 AM. ECON. REv.
54, 54 (1991) (stating that ex ante regulation requires "agency officials to decide
individual cases instead of judges and juries; resolves some generic issues in
rulemakings not linked to individual cases; uses nonjudicialized procedures to
evaluate technocratic information; affects behavior ex ante without waiting for
harm to occur, and minimizes the inconsistent and unequal coverage arising from
individual adjudication").
307 Samuel Issacharoff, Regulating After the Fact, 56 DEPAUL L. REv. 375, 380
(2007).

308 Charles D. Kolstad, Thomas S. Ulen, & Gary v. Johnson, Ex Post Liability
for Harm us. Ex Ante Safety Regulation: Substitutes or Complements?, 80 AM.
ECON. REv. 888, 888 (1990) (emphasis omitted).
309 Id. at 889; see also Steven Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability
and Safety Regulation, 15 RAND J. ECON. 271, 271 (1984) ("[Ilt is often socially
advantageous for the two means of controlling risk to be jointly employed-for
parties to be required to satisfy a regulatory standard and also to face possible
liability.").
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Even assuming this need for ex post enforcement through
litigation, questions remain about the form of litigated oversight. I emphasize here the virtues of aggregate litigation over
retail challenges to the outcomes of specific cases. Aggregate
challenges (such as class actions, facial challenges, and the
like) usefully direct attention to system-wide causes of constitutional harm. They invite remedies fashioned to account for
the interests of all regulated subjects-and not, say, instruments that improve on accuracy for a subset of the regulated
population while increasing errors for a majority. This aggregate/retail distinction is not the sole important question of
remedial decision choice (and is surely not important only in
this context). But I focus on it because of its singular importance in the machine-learning context.
A.

Regulating Algorithms

Administrative agencies have long been "key actors responsible for implementing congressional commands contained in
statutes."3 1 0 In comparison to legislators and courts, agencies
boast comparative institutional advantages in expertise and
responsiveness. 3 1 1 Ex ante regulation is possible by both federal and subnational agencies. States such as California are
enacting statutory protections of privacy that will impinge on
the way in which private actors can deploy machine learning. 3 12 Municipalities such as Seattle and Santa Clara have
310 Bertrall L. Ross II, Embracing Administrative Constitutionalism, 95 B.U. L.
REV. 519, 527 (2015); see also Sophia Z. Lee, Race, Sex, and Rulemaking: Administrative Constitutionalism and the Workplace, 1960 to the Present, 96 VA. L. REV.
799, 801 (2010) (defining administrative constitutionalism as "regulatory agencies' interpretation and implementation of constitutional law"); Gillian E. Metzger,
Administrative Constitutionalism, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1897, 1900 (2013) (describing
administrative constitutionalism as "encompass[ing] the elaboration of new constitutional understandings by administrative actors");. Of course, this might
change if constitutional doctrine changes. Cf. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct.
2116, 2131-32 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (casting doubt on rule-making
delegations to federal agencies).
311 Margaret H. Lemos, Special Incentives to Sue, 95 MINN. L. REv. 782, 786-87
(2011).
312 See, e.g., Assemb. B. 375 (Ca. 2018) ("[G]rant[ing] ... consumer[s] a right to
request a business to disclose the categories and specific pieces of personal
information that it collects about the consumer, the categories of sources from
which that information is collected, the business purposes for collecting or selling
the information, and the categories of 3rd parties with which the information is
shared."); Dipayan Ghosh, What You Need to Know About California's New Data
Privacy Law, HARv. BUs. REv. (July 11, 2018), https://hbr.org/2018/07/what-

[https://perma.cc/
you-need-to-know-about-californias-new-data-privacy-law
49DF-ADv4] (summarizing the background and effects of California's Consumer
Privacy Act).

2020]

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

1941

enacted regulations covering not only the collection but also
analysis of surveillance data. 3 13 These examples are unlikely
to prove isolated. To the contrary, interjurisdictional diffusion,
imitation, and competition likely will generate healthy rates of
regulatory innovation even absent federal action.
Ex ante regulation can be used to create substantive standards or to create a disclosure regime. I address each of these
possibilities in turn.
1.

Substantive Regulatory Interventions

The most common ex ante regulatory intervention relevant
to machine learning in nonpublic hands is privacy by design.
Both the European Union and the federal government have
adopted mandates of that kind. 3 14 Scholars have devoted considerable attention to refining privacy-by-design principles. 3 1 5
I will focus here on regulating for equality. This is a useful
focus because the regulatory focus on privacy to date has made
equality values more costly to enforce because it has deprived
regulators and private parties of information necessary to identify discriminatory phenomena.3 1 6 For example, a 2019 Illinois

statute regulating the use of machine learning in hiring decisions mandates the destruction of video data within thirty days
of an interview upon an interviewee's request-a measure that
likely makes it more difficult to ascertain ex post whether unlawful discrimination may have occurred in the hiring process. 3 17 As legislators and agencies consider how public uses
of machine learning are managed, greater attention to computational infrastructure conducive to equality norms is thus
313 Seattle Mun. Code § 14.18.010 (Wash. 2017) (regulating "any electronic
data collected, captured, recorded, retained, processed, intercepted, or analyzed
by surveillance technology acquired by the City or operated at the direction of the
City"). Similar measures include Santa Clara County, Code of Ordinances § A407(c) (Cal. 2020).
314 See FTC, supra note 286, at 22-34; Commission Regulation 2016/679,
2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU).
315
See, e.g., WOODROW HARrzOG, PRIVACY'S BLUEPRINT: THE BATLE TO CONTROL

12 (2018) (offering a framework for law and
policy that uses privacy by design to regulate consumer protection and surveillance); Mulligan & Bamberger, supranote 295, at 740-80 (proposing a new institutional, technological, and conceptual framework to preserve privacy-by-design);
Waldman, supranote 296, at 1266-85 (using products liability to answer privacyby-design's open questions).
316 Mulligan & Bamberger, supra note 295, at 728 ("Limiting the availability of
attributes like race, gender, and nationality can limit blatantly intentional discrimination but confounds efforts such as this to root out more invidious forms of
discriminatory profiling."); accord Dwork & Mulligan, supra note 270, at 37.
317 Artificial Intelligence Video Interview Act, 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 42/1 (2020).
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useful. In that spirit, this section outlines an equality-related
regulatory intervention-a mandate to adopt the "best feasible"
nondiscriminatory algorithm. This idea, I should note in advance, need not be limited to equality norms, but might also
have due process and privacy applications.
One regulatory mandate worth exploring works by analogy
to the "Best Available Technology" (BAT) rules employed in several federal environmental statutes. 3 18 The gist of the idea is
that regulating agencies would mandate a BAT requirement for
nondiscriminatory (fair) algorithms (although it is possible to
engage the same mandate in respect to security against data
breaches).
Under the Clean Water Act, for example the EPA determines the "best practicable control technology" by accounting,
inter alia, for "the total cost of application of technology in
relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be achieved from
such application" and "the age of equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the
application of various types of control techniques, process
changes, ... [and] environmental impact."3 19 BAT mandates of
this ilk allow the agency to derive an appropriate regulatory
standard from the observed distribution of industry practices. 3 20 Closer to the context at hand, they have been proposed as a liability rule for websites' responsibilities respecting
copyright enforcement. 3 2 1
BAT rules might be implemented in a number of different
ways. For example, they might be framed in general terms so
as to impose a burden on regulated actors to select or develop
instruments that minimize a set of race- or gender-related
costs and benefits or to maximize certain outcomes. Rather
than directing those actors to employ a preselected instrument,
the mandate would leave it to courts to ascertain what counted
as a BAT through after-the-fact litigation. This approach leverages the possibility that regulated actors are better positioned
than agencies to identify and develop mechanisms for optimizing over costs and benefits.
318 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2) (2018) (requiring Best Available Technology economically achievable for toxic pollutants under the Clean Water Act).
319

Id. at § 1314(b)(1)(B).

320 Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Norming in Administrative Law, 68
DUKE L.J. 1383, 1396-98 (2019); see also Andrea Roth, Machine Testimony, 126
YALE L.J. 1972, 2024-25 (2017) (offering this suggestion in respect to machinebased testimony).
321 Lital Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available Technology Standard, 111 CoLuM. L. REv. 1194, 1217-18 (2011).
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Alternatively, an agency might simply promulgate an openended "list of best available technologies . . . ex ante" from
which regulated entities would select. 3 2 2 This pathway would
place a burden on the regulating agency to identify equalityfavoring innovations ex ante. The agency might derive this
information from observation of private market behavior, or
alternatively, through an information-revelation mechanism
such as a system of prizes or research grants. 3 2 3 Finally, a BAT
for constraining discriminatory effects might entail the crafting
of an equality term that can be included in a classifier equation.3 2 4 Of course, any of these regulatory approaches requires
the agency to define ex ante the form of (racial or gender) equality it deems important even if the burden of technical design
that falls on the agency would otherwise vary.
BAT mandates of this form, in sum, illustrate the kinds of
substantive mandates that can be used to elicit ex ante salutary forms of algorithmic action. The example, though, is not
meant to be exhaustive. To the contrary, I offer it to suggest the
potential of regulatory mandates, with the expectations that
others can and should be imagined. 3 25
2.

Transparency and DisclosureMandates

Another pathway for ex ante regulation focuses on disclosure of various sorts-or forms-of what has come to be known
as transparency and explainability in algorithmic design. I be322

Id.

at 1224.

323 For the relative merits of prize mechanisms, see Brian D. wright, The
Economics ofInvention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts, 73 AM.
ECON. REv. 691, 696-700 (1983).
324 This is suggested in an unpublished paper. See generally Michele
Samorani, Shannon L. Harris, Linda Goler Blount, Haibing Lu, & Michael A.
Santoro, Overbooked and Overlooked: Machine Learning and Racial Bias in Medical Appointment Scheduling 15-16 (Oct. 9, 2019) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3467047 [https://perma.cc/E8E5-YRJP. The proposal, however, is novel and should be regarded as only a possibility absent
further scrutiny.
325 In the privacy context, for example, one mandate might focus on minimizing the risk of deanonymization. See Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy:
Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REv. 1701,
1716 (2010). A 2011 comprehensive metastudy of health-related data acknowledged reidentification risk and concluded that it was "insufficient" to draw strong
conclusions about the magnitude of such risk. See generally Khaled El Emam,
Elizabeth Jonker, Luk Arbuckle, & Bradley Malin, A Systematic Review of ReidentificationAttacks on Health Data, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2011, at 1. However, more
recent work underscores the possibility of embedding privacy-protective design
features into data to prevent reidentiflcation, including the exclusion of certain
features and perturbation of the data. See generally Khaled El Emam, Sam Rodgers, & Bradley Malin, Anonymising and SharingIndividual PatientData, 350 BMJ
1 (2015).
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gin by offering a cautious note about the ambiguous meaning
and potential costs of transparency. I then explore specific
ways in which these difficulties can be resolved. Finally, I identify some specific disclosure mandates that facilitate important
ex post judgments about constitutional norms, even though
these are not well described as "transparency" mandates.
Despite a recent "resurgence" of interest in "explainable
artificial intelligence," the precise meanings of that term and its
3 26 The former
cognate "transparency" remain hotly contested.
term has even been criticized as a "suitcase word[ ]" that
"pack[s] together a variety of meanings" but that "holds no
3 2 7 A threshold, and critiuniversally agreed-upon meaning."
cal, ambiguity concerns the threshold object of the exercise. A
disclosure mandate might focus either on "the mechanism by
which the model works" or, alternatively, on a justification or
3 28 This is
an explanation of a specific classification decision.
the difference between a request for a global explanation (i.e.,
providing a covering law that characterizes the algorithm's
work) and a local explanation (focused on a specific
instance).329

Popular writing often seems to assume that machine learn3 3 0 And indeed, it is the case
ing is unavoidably inscrutable.
that many forms of machine-learning architectures are so complicated that their manner of computing outcomes, or their
326 Tim Miller, Explanation in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Social
Sciences, 267 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 1, 1-2 (2019). For another survey that underscores the breadth of the term, see Michael Gleicher, A Frameworkfor Considering Comprehensibilityin Modeling, 4 BIG DATA 75, 77-84 (2016).
327 Zachary C. Lipton & Jacob Steinhardt, Troubling Trends in Machine-Learning Scholarship, 17 ACM QUEUE, Jan.-Feb. 2019, at 1, 15.
328 Zachary C. Lipton, The Mythos of Model Interpretability, ACM QUEUE,
May-June 2018, at 1, 12-13; cf. Coglianese & Lehr, supra note 72, at 20-22
(distinguishing "fishbowl" transparency, which is transparency into what the government has done, from "reasoned" transparency, which focuses on the reasons
for action). Selbst and Barocas distinguish between inscrutability (pertaining to
how something works) and nonintuitiveness (why it works that way). Andrew D.
Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of ExplainableMachines, 87 FORDHAM
L. REv. 1085, 1089-91 (2018). These margins both concern the choice of method
and not the result. Andrew D. Selbst & Solon Barocas, The Intuitive Appeal of
ExplainableMachines, 87 FORDHAM L. REv. 1085, 1089-91 (2018). These margins
both concern the choice of method, and not the result.
329 Amina Adadi & Mohammed Berrada, Peeking Inside the Black-Box: A Survey on Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI), 6 IEEE ACCESS 52138, 52147-48
(2018) (drawing the global/local distinction).
330 See, e.g., Knight, supra note 15 ("We've never before built machines that
operate in ways their creators don't understand. How well can we expect to
communicate-and get along with-intelligent machines that could be unpredictable and inscrutable?"). Knight, to be sure, recognizes that he is discussing only a
subset of machine learning.
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design, cannot be easier conveyed in a nontechnical form. This
is acutely so for deep-learning instruments. 3 3 1 In 2015, for
example, Microsoft developed a prize-winning convolutional
neural network called ResNet. 3 3 2 Not only did ResNet have 152
layers of neurons in its network, it also used a device called
skip-connections, which allow neurons in an "outer" layer to
feed directly into neuron layers much deeper in the network's
architecture. Accounts of ResNet suggest that there is no easy
way to "explain" how the network operates to a nonspecialist,
or to retrace the computational steps needful to reach a particular outcome. If "transparency" is understood to demand an
account of how ResNet works in its particular that is legible to a
lay person, it may well be a fool's errand.
But ResNet is not necessarily typical of the models currently in common state use. The assumption that all machinelearning models are as impenetrable as ResNet is also flawed.
For there are other methods, such as decision trees and linear
models, that are far more "easily understandable and interpretable for humans." 3 3 3 At the global level, therefore, the available
scope for explanation is a function of the choice of algorithmic
method. The most sophisticated (and hence effective) algorithms in usage now, deep learning instruments, tend to be the
most difficult to represent because of their scale, their use of
distributed representations, and the iterative nature of their
computations. 33 4 While there is research ongoing on rendering
deep learning instruments more intuitive through a combination of expository tools, 3 3 5 global-level transparency mandates
focused on how a specific method operates are likely to require
a trade-off between competing normative ends of transparency
and accuracy. At times this trade-off can be avoided. One way
to mitigate it, for example, is to seek "simple rules" that per-

331

Marcus, supra note 60, at 10-11.

332

KELLEHER,

333

Riccardo Guidotti et al., A Survey of Methods for Explaining Black Box

supra

note 43, at 170.

Models, 51 ACM COMPUTING SUR VEYS 93:1, 93:7 (2018).
334 KELLEHER, supra note 43, at 243-44; Adadi & Berrada, supra note 329, at
52145.
335 Chris Olah and colleagues, for example, have suggested that "disparate

techniques now come together in a unified grammar, fulfilling complementary
roles in the resulting interfaces .. . [that] allow[ ] us to systematically explore the
space of interpretability interfaces, enabling us to evaluate whether they meet
particular goals." Chris Olah et al., The Building Blocks of Interpretability,DISTILL
(Mar. 6, 2018), https://distill.pub/2018/building-blocks/ [https://perma.cc/
T2KX-SRQL]. They use this composite method to offer explanations of deep learning tools.

1946

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 105:1875

form (almost) as well as complex instruments yet are more
33 6
readily comprehensible.
Within these constraints, an explanation of a classification
outcome-why was this person jailed, or that benefit denied?might proceed in a number of different ways. Like global explanations, outcome-specific explanations can be more or less feasible depending on how they are conceptualized. An outcome
could be explained in terms of its designer's goals: x result was
reached because the algorithm was designed to do p. It could
alternatively index the specifics of an instrument's technical
architecture (say, the manner in which hyperparameters were
calibrated). 3 3 7 A third form of explanation focuses on causality. To "explain" a specific outcome might thus be to offer a
causal explanation-a formulation that might elide with a
method-focused definition of transparency, or that might run
into difficulty because of the noncausal quality of much machine-learning inference.
In contrast to these approaches--each of which raises
technical or conceptual difficulties-recent studies of explanation in the machine-learning context instead suggest that the
most commonly observed demand from human users is one for
"contrastive" explanations. These "do not explain the causes
for an event per se, but explain the cause of an event relative to
3 3 8 That is, they give an
some other event that did not occur.
answer to the question "why x and not y." A demand for a
contrastive explanation entails the identification of counterfactuals in which a minimal number of features are changed to
reach a different classification, or a justification that links that
outcome to some underlying policy judgment or latent variable. 3 3 9 Transparency of this kind is a tractable design option in
many cases. But which of these implementation mechanisms
is appropriate will depend on the specific normative questions
340
raised by algorithmic decision making in a given context.

See, e.g., Jung et al., supra note 41 (exploring the availability of "fast,
336
frugal, and clear" decision procedures across a range of domains).
337 That is, terms set by human judgment rather than being computed by the
machine itself.
338 Miller, supra note 326, at 9.
339

CHRISTOPH MOLNAR, INTERPRETABLE MACHINE LEARNING: A GUIDE FOR MAKING

BLACK Box MODELS EXPLAINABLE 37-38, 241-43 (2020).
340 Menaka Narayanan et al., How Do Humans Understand Explanations from
Machine Learning Systems? An Evaluation of the Human-Interpretability of Explanation 1-3, 15 (Feb. 5, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (discussing why different kinds of explanation differ, and how to craft effective responses).
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In addition to these decision-specific options, there is a
range of more specific disclosure mandates to facilitate ex post
accounting. I offer three examples of these.
First, an algorithmic decision should be accompanied by a
"datasheet" that records the choices and manipulations of
training data, and the "composition, collection process, recommended uses, and so on" of the raiding data. 3 4 1
Second, an algorithm should be designed for
"auditability ... to enable third parties to probe and review the
behavior of an algorithm."3 4 2 At a most basic level, this might
be done through inclusion of an application programming interface (API) that facilitates downstream review even without
access to the underlying algorithm. 3 4 3
Finally, cryptographic commitments embedded in an algorithm's code are a way of ensuring that the same, known
decision rules are applied to all regulated subjects. 3 44 A related
possibility, developed by the Open Algorithms project of Imperial College London and the MIT Media Lab, is the use of
blockchain as a record to log the manner in which an algorithm
is used across particular cases. 3 4 5 A similar possible design
mandate with the ambition of enabling proof ex post would
require an algorithm to produce "a tamper-evident record that
provides non-repudiable evidence of all nodes' actions." 3 4 6

341
Timnit Gebru et al., Datasheets for Datasets, 2 (Jan. 15, 2020) (unpublished manuscript).
342 Nicholas Diakopoulos & Sorelle Friedler, How to Hold Algorithms Accountable, MIT TECH. REV. (Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/
602933/how-to-hold-algorithms-accountable/ [https://perma.cc/3VFU-ZTJM].
343
It is possible to access a black-boxed algorithm via an API to test how
certain features (e.g., protected-class membership) influences outcomes without
disclosing the algorithm's operating rules. Philip Adler et al., Auditing Black-Box
Models for Indirect Influence, 54 KNOWLEDGE & INFO. SYSTEMS 95, 96-97 (2018).
344 Kroll et al., supra note 140, at 665-67 (describing a "cryptographic commitment," a digitally generated, tamper-proof certification, that assures that "(1)
[a] particular decision policy was used and (2) ... particular data were used as
input to the decision policy"). Another precommitment device is the zero-knowledge proof, which can be used to prove that a certain decision policy was actually

used without revealing its contents. Id. at 668.
345
Bruno Lepri, Nuria Oliver, Emmanuel Letouze, Alex Pentland, & Patrick
Vinck, Fair, Transparent, and Accountable Algorithmic Decision-making Processes,
31 PHIL. & TECH. 611, 622-24 (2018) (describing the implementation of the Open
Algorithms project).

346

Andreas Haeberlen, Petr Kouznetsov, & Peter Druschel, PeerReview: Practi-

cal Accountabilityfor DistributedSystems, 2007 ACM SIGOPS OPERATING SYSTEMS
REv. 175, 175; accord Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide
to Algorithms and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 10-11 (2017).
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None of these options ought to be impeded by trade secrecy
claims on behalf of algorithms' creators. 3 4 7 A regulatory
agency should mandate that certain parameters and
hyperparameters be disclosed alongside a machine's operation.
For due process purposes, this might include the nature and
origins of the training data, any constraints imposed upon
rules that could be learned from that data, the outcome variable, and the latent construct. It is difficult to see how any of
these disclosure obligations would impinge upon intellectual
property interests in algorithmic design, even on the assumption that such an interest was a substantial one, given the
availability of a protective order. Even where a vendor who has
sold the state an algorithmic system does claim intellectual
property protection, a regulator could reasonably compel the
vendor to make public sufficient detail to understand how historical data is translated into prediction or prescription. Agencies not only have clear power to condition access to state
contracts on such disclosure, they can appeal to the publicity34 8
oriented justification of intellectual property law itself.

Because the decisions relevant to those norms are often
embedded in the threshold development and design of a machine-learning system, regulators are well positioned to generate mandates and constraints that conduce to constitutional
compliance. Indeed, a takeaway from my analysis is that there
is a wide array of ex ante tools available to regulators wishing to
promote constitutional norms in the machine-learning state.
The taxonomy offered here is not an exhaustive guide to how
such regulation should be framed. It rather presents a first
step in developing needful regulatory frameworks for promoting a machine-learning state under the rule of law.
B.

Litigating the Constitutionality of Algorithms

Ex ante regulation is necessary, but is not sufficient, to
promote constitutionalism in the machine-learning state. Designers of a machine-learning system cannot be certain before
the fact of how their instrument will perform across all conceivable circumstances. Learned rules can and do prove brittle in
See Wexler, supra note 145 (describing the problem with creators protect347
ing their algorithms with trade secrecy claims).
348 Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets As IP
Rights, 61 STAN. L. REV. 311, 332-33 (2008).
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the teeth of unexpected phenomenon. 34 9 Designers of a machine-learning system, even if subject to robust ex ante regulation, may also fail to install or maintain appropriate protections
for constitutional norms. Privacy-protective software patches,
for example, might not be timely installed. Hardware obsolescence may not be mitigated. A loose fit between the outcome
variable and the latent construct of interest may slip into the
design. As a result, some form of ex post litigation is necessary
even with ex ante regulation in place.
The optimal litigation form for enforcing constitutional
norms in the machine-learning state is wholesale and not retail. It takes the algorithmic system's operation as the relevant
transactional frame. It offers injunctive relief aimed at correction and improvement of that system's operation as a remedy.
It should not aim to generate damages or even categorical negative injunctions that prohibit machine learning in all circumstances, or even opt-outs for specific, select plaintiffs without
any regard to how the majority of regulated subjects are
treated. 3 5 0 Litigation's ambition, therefore, should be understood in terms of systemic amelioration in line with the wholesale nature of due process, equality, and privacy norms.
A suit to enforce constitutional norms against an algorithmic governance tool will perforce focus on the tool's system-level operation. Due process challenges under Mathews
will usually turn on one of the ways (discussed above) in which
algorithmic architecture can generate substantial numbers of
false positives or false negatives. 3 5 1 Equality challenges hinging on either intent or classification will centrally concern the
choices of training data, features, and outcome variable (although the way in which those parameters are analyzed remains up in the air). 3 5 2 And privacy litigation will tend to focus
on system-level vulnerabilities of software or hardware, and
failures to implement privacy by design. 3 5 3 Regulatory mandates along certain design margins, such as transparency requirements, cryptographic commitments, and zero-day proofs
can facilitate litigation by rendering predictable litigants' access to important empirical and technical details. And a burden-shifting mechanism, akin to that used in disparate impact
349

350
351
352
353

See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
See Huq, supra note 174, at 628-29.

See supra section II.A.2.
See supra section II.B.2.
See supra subpart II.C.
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litigation, 3 5 4 can be used to weed out insufficiently robust design choices along all three margins.
Constitutional litigation in this vein can be filed either by
private or public plaintiffs. A public agency would file suit
against a coordinate body within government. Such suits can
3 5 6 States
be observed at both the federal3 5 5 and the state level.
also have "parens patriae" standing to vindicate "quasi-sovereign" interests, which is understood to include a "general interest" in the welfare of its citizens of the sort that a state might try
3 5 7 The
"to address through its sovereign lawmaking powers."
latter might be relevant when constitutional interests are vindicated best through a suit against a private party acting in coordination with the state. A parens patriae suit might be
brought, for example, against the supplier of algorithmic
software or the hardware on the ground that it (say) created an
improper risk to state residents' privacy interests.
Such suits have not to date been brought. Even if they
emerge, it seems likely that public enforcement of constitutional norms in the machine-learning context will remain at
undesirably low levels. Agencies operating under a state or
federal aegis have strong incentives to settle their disputes internally rather than in the court. At present, the necessary
institutional infrastructure for the robust enforcement of due
process, equality and privacy norms detailed in Part II simply
does not exist. In its absence, it seems likely that private litigation will continue to play an important role in trying to vindi3 58
cate constitutional norms in the machine-learning state.
The obvious form that private enforcement could take is
the class action suit in state or federal court. The Supreme
Court has recently restricted state courts' jurisdiction to adjudicate national class actions. 3 5 9 But state courts remain able
See 42 U.S.C.
354
for Title VII).
355

§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i)

(2018) (setting forth burden shifting test

Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O'Connell, Agencies as Adversaries, 105

CALIF. L. REv. 1375, 1415 (2017) (documenting cases).

356 See, e.g., Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 261
(2011) (permitting Ex parte Young action by an independent state agency against
a coordinate agency).
357 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex ret. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607
& n.14 (1982) (emphasis omitted).
358 For an analogous argument in the antitrust context, see HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 58-63 (2005).
359 See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1783-84

(2017). For a useful discussion of the case's effects, see generally Andrew D.
Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants' Terms: Bristol-Myers
Squibb and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REv. 1251,
1281-1306 (2018).
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to resolve challenges to state-level policies implemented by
state officials. Such suits have been lodged, for example, to
challenge deficiencies in the funding of public defense offices
and other criminal justice dysfunctionalities. 3 6 0 And as noted,
there is already a scattering of suits challenging the use of
machine learning and similar tools in public benefits, teacher
evaluation, and bail contexts. 3 6 1 A thousand more flowers, so
to speak, should bloom.
Suits challenging algorithmic governance have yielded a
range of reforms. In Houston, the challenge to the EVAAS
teacher evaluation system led to the school district abandoning
algorithmic assessment. 3 6 2 In the challenge to the Arkansas
benefits system described earlier, litigation revealed that "a
third-party software vendor implementing the system[ ] [had]
mistakenly used a version of the algorithm that didn't account
for diabetes issues," and forced the state to correct the flaw.363
And in an Idaho suit challenging a benefits algorithm, plaintiffs
"work[ed] with the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare to
develop a new model." 3 64 The settlement ultimately accepted
by the Idaho district court contained a twenty-four-step pro365
cess for evaluating and recalibrating the benefits process.
None of the cases I have identified ultimately led to a damages
award. This militates against the concern that legal challenge
will generate disabling liabilities for state and municipal actors
out of proportion to their fault. 3 6 6 These examples suggest that
360 See, e.g., Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 219-20 (N.Y. 2010)
(challenging that the state's underfunded public defenders deprive indigent defendants the right to Assistance of Counsel); Kuren v. Luzerne Cty., 146 A.3d 715,
718 (Pa. 2016) (same); see also Pub. Def., Eleventh Judicial Circuit v. State, 115

So. 3d 261, 265-66 (Fla. 2013) (stating that public defenders successfully moved
to withdraw from nonfelony cases, citing a lack of resources); Phan v. State, 723
S.E.2d 876, 880-81 (Ga. 2012) (challenging that the state's public defender's
system had a systematic breakdown which violated the defendant's speedy trial
right).

361 See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
362 Shelby Webb & John D. Harden, Houston ISD Settles with Union over
Controversial Teacher Evaluations, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 12, 2017, 8:45 AM), https:/
/www.chron.com/news/education/article/Houston-ISD-settles-with-unionover-teacher-12267893.php [https://perma.cc/Y4C6-8UCK].
363 Lecher, supra note 14.
AI Now INST., LITIGATING ALGORITHMS: CHALLENGING GOVERNMENT USE OF AL364
GORITHMIC DECISION SYSTEMS 9 (2018), https://ainowinstitute.org/litigatin-

galgorithms.pdf [https://perma.cc/9EKU-2AHZ].
365 Settlement Agreement at 9-10, K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703 (D.
Idaho 2016), No. 1:12-cv-00022-BLW.
366 The risk of disproportionate liability has led some district courts to limit
liability in cases of data breach. Cf. Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359,
368 (M.D. Pa. 2015) ("[F]or a court to require companies to pay damages to
thousands of customers, when there is yet to be a single case of identity theft
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class action challenges to algorithmic governance techniques
could be successful both in the sense of foreclosing the use of
machine-learning tools in the absence of appropriate data and
also catalyzing processes of analysis and reconstruction
whereby the algorithm is not abandoned but improved. In this
fashion, litigation supplies in part the necessary spur to check
continuously for deviations from ground truth, to eliminate
brittleness, and to account for distortions such as
discrimination.

Regulation and litigation, as in many domains, are complementary partners in the catalysis of constitutional norms for
the machine-learning state. Both are in their infancy now.
There is almost no regulatory architecture in place at either the
state or the federal level at the moment. There are a handful of
suits challenging machine-learning tools. They provide useful
proofs of concept. But neither the regulatory nor the litigation
system is prepared, in sophistication or capacity, for the ongo-

ing diffusion of algorithmic governance. As machine-learning
tools spread across both the coercive, criminal justice state as
well as its regulatory and welfare counterparts, there will be
increasing cause to find an effectual regulatory architecture for
the algorithmic state. This Part has begun that task by sketching the basic elements of the network of regulation and litiga-

tion necessary to ensuring that our algorithmic state is also a
constitutional state.
CONCLUSION

Liberal constitutionalism entails a commitment to maintaining bounds on state power. That commitment is tested
when "the technological and military character of governments
and the productive relationships" of society change. 3 6 7 The
"powerful and highly generalizable" 3 68 technology of machine
learning poses a challenge to our constitutional system because it has the capability to transform the relationship between the state and its citizens.
I have suggested a suite of responses to that concern here.
But more generally, I worry that new computational tools will
proven, strikes us as overzealous and unduly burdensome to businesses."). While
an injunction might also impose costs on a public entity, it creates no perverse
incentive to file socially negative value suits.
367 Shklar, supra note 1, at 24.
368

GREENFIELD, supra note 9.
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tend to increase the capability of the state to analyze, predict,
and control its subjects' behavior. They are also likely to decrease citizens' ability to understand and raises objections to
coercive projections of state power. At the limit, the use of
those technologies may cast doubt on the necessary conditions
for the meaningful play of democratic control.
This potential asymmetry in power between the machinelearning state and its subjects (formerly citizens) presents a
formidable challenge in the medium term. That challenge is
most acute and most visible in China, where a range of surveillance and analytic technologies are deployed to suppress political dissent and leash ethnic and religious identity. But we
should be under no illusions that the same technologies (and
more) cannot find parallel uses in liberal democracies. Nor
should we be under any illusion that steps explored here will
on their own be sufficient to check the progress of a technocratic illiberalism. Far from it. Legal countermeasures of this
ilk to the totalizing shadow of the state are always only adjuncts to larger, democratic efforts to keep the balance between
state and citizen from capsizal. They will be effective only if
conjoined with popular pressure, of the kind seen most recently in San Francisco's facial recognition ban, to check the
machine-learning state when doing so remains within reach. It
is the scale and passion of such public movements that will
determine whether state algorithms comply with the rule of
law, or whether instead they will be deployed to temper the
democratic project.
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